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Cybernetics is philosophically significant in two 
fundamental ways: Implicit in its fundamental concepts are
a model of man and a conceived frame of reference in terms 
of which a somewhat new treatment of the problems of 
philosophy can be undertaken. The primary tasks undertaken 
in this essay are, first, to elaborate a frame of reference 
and a model, and, second, to treat briefly some basic philo­
sophical problems in accordance with this new perspective.
Cybernetics is also significant for philosophy in 
that it can be viewed as the latest development in that 
philosophical school which originated with Aristotle. Be­
cause Norbert Wiener, in the introduction to his Cybernetics. 
discusses the historical antecedents of cybernetics, I have 
not stressed the development of the discipline here.
I have, however, in Chapter Five discussed the 
notion of indirect communication in some detail. The 
treatment is, in this instance, historical, partly because 
the subject is most easily treated in this fashion and 
partly because little has appeared on the subject; and con­
sequently, I thought such a treatment would be informative.
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%  essay is something of an experiment in per­
spective. Chapter One states the theme of the essay and 
serves as an introduction to the general systems point of 
view— first by telling, then by showing. Chapters Two 
through Five are intended to stand in an interwoven pattern 
of opposition to each other. Chapters Two and Three are 
each concerned with an interrelated complex of problems as 
they primarily relate to the individual— Chapter Two is 
biased toward a "topside" view while Chapter Three shows a 
complementary bias for viewing things from the "underside."
Chapters Four and Five form a slightly sharper 
objective-subjective contrast and, taken together, oppose 
Chapters Two and Three in that the former are more socially 
oriented. I must emphasize that I have deliberately under­
taken to preserve some degree of objective-subjective and 
individual-social tension in each chapter, but each has its 
deliberately created bias. Chapter Six is supposed to re­
solve these tensions. It is my intention that the reader 
shall, in the course of reading this essay, undergo from 
time to time mild shifts in perspective, but I want the 
focus to remain unclear until the final chapter.
Although the problems dealt with in this paper have 
occupied my attention for the last fifteen years, the final 
form did not suggest itself to me until about a month before 
this essay was written. While presenting a paper on some 
of the notions contained in the first half of this essay, I
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felt constrained to apologize for the loose texture of the 
arguments. To my surprise, that paper was well received.
It occurred to me that there is often a positive virtue to 
leaving gaps and slightly blurring the focus of at least a 
portion of a work. Tension is necessary for growth and 
while there is some tension produced through sharper con­
trast, it is definitely heightened if the contrast is ever 
so slightly blurred. Tension can be further heightened by 
working with more than one contrast of perspectives at once, 
Thus it is that each of the four internal chapters of this 
essay lacks internal balance, but they hang together, it is 
hoped, in mutual support. I have gone to almost absurd 
lengths to soften the contrasts in the four internal chap­
ters. For instance, I have often avoided the rhetorically 
sharper "because" in place of "so" in order that the line 
between causal and logical dependence not be too sharply 
drawn. Finally, there is an internal-external contrast; it 
is a contrast of sharpness of focus with respect to per­
spective.
It is my belief that philosophical "truth" is not 
to be found in the clear logic of a rigorously drawn con­
clusion, for it is always the frame of reference in light 
of which our propositions have their meaning that needs 
justification. Philosophy thus has more in common with art 
than with science. It is that subtlety of mind which is 
exemplified in Laurence Sterne or Honoré de Balzac that is
Vi
needed in philosophy, not the heavy-handed, rule-of-thumh 
thinking characteristic of the logician. The tendency 
toward homomorphic reduction, which is our way of character­
izing general principle, must be resisted when we are in the 
evaluative stage of an enterprise. How often have you had 
to deal with the administrator who catalogs you as one of a 
type and proceeds to interpret your every response in light 
of this stereotype 1 "And when I am formulated, sprawling 
on a pin,/ When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
. . . ." in the annotation of one of Capablanca's chess 
games, I once came across the following passage; "Captur­
ing toward the center is a good rule of thumb; Capablanca, 
however, does not play with his thumbs?" This is an 
admirable characterization of intelligence. And it is with 
intelligence that we must approach our fellow man; I would 
lay a moral obligation upon every man— it is the moral 
obligation to be intelligent.
Most of the material in Chapter One, and much of 
that in Chapter Two, is derived from, or related to, the 
work of three men: Norbert Wiener, Claude Shannon, and
W. Ross Ashby. The world-view which emerges in these first 
two chapters turns out to be quite Aristotelean, although 
this fact was only noted after the main outline was con­
structed. The chief difference with Aristotle is that a 
commitment to realism is resolutely resisted. The source 
of this resistance to realism is readily apparent. Anyone
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who has even a nodding acquaintance with the philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein will perceive his influence as it 
emerges in Chapter Two and becomes the dominant theme in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Three could have been called, with 
some justice, an analytical defense of cybernetics.
Although less readily apparent, the influence of 
P. F. Strawson, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Ian Philip 
McGreal is considerable in Chapter Three. The content of 
Chapter Three is also influenced by John Dewey's conception 
of the role of context in thought and communication.
Dewey's influence persists into Chapter Four, where an ex­
tended discussion of B. F. Skinner's Walden Two is used as 
a vehicle for the discussion of the social effects of social 
planning. Little needs be said here, by way of acknowl­
edgment, about Chapter Five; explicit references are given 
in detail. The influence of the men cited above can be 
noted in Chapter Six.
Although little or no specific mention is made of 
the following men in the essay, their influence has helped 
shape the character of my thought; I suspect that the 
reader will discover many things reminiscent of each in the 
following pages. I owe much to George Santayana,
Alfred North Whitehead, Donold Hebb, Benjamin Whorf,
Walter B. Cannon, Friedrich Nietzsche, and John von Neumann. 
These sources will be cited in the bibliography.
Vlll
Finally, what follows can he characterized as an 
attempt to avoid commitment either to the notion that 
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CYBERNETICS
CHAPTER I 
THE GENERAL SYSTEMS WAY OF THINKING
My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the 
power of the written word to make you hear, to make you 
feel— it is, before all, to make you see. That— and no 
more, and it is everything. If I succeed, you shall 
find there according to your deserts; encouragement, 
consolation, fear, charm— all you demand— and, perhaps, 
also that glimpse of truth for which you have for­
gotten to ask.
Joseph Conrad
This essay is concerned with the philosophical sig­
nificance of a scientific discipline— cybernetics.^ It is 
not primarily concerned with (1) the science itself, (2) its 
application to technology, or (3) the socio-ecological 
effects of cybernetic-inspired technology. It will, of 
course, be necessary to describe some of the basic notions 
of cybernetics, but this description will be as sketchy and 
brief as possible.
"Cybernetics" comes from the Greek word for steers­
man. See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd. ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965)? P* 11*
2Cybernetics, as I see it, carries with it a point of 
view— a perspective— from which judgments will be passed on 
the significance of all human activity. Such judgments 
will, of course, be expressed in language and will have to do 
with language— our symbolic frame of reference. Thus, from a 
point of view conditioned by the concepts of cybernetics, we 
shall judge the philosophical significance of linguistic 
behavior. Now, linguistic behavior is a form of human ac­
tivity; and the philosophical significance of any human 
activity is what that activity, in its global sense, does 
to the symbolic frame of reference of those people engaged 
in that activity and, derivatively, how those people, so 
altered, will affect others.
It seems that, already, I am asking you to do some­
thing paradoxical— to judge the significance of cybernetics 
from a perspective conditioned by cybernetics. But, is it 
paradoxical to say, "Put on these glasses and then speculate 
about how putting on these glasses will affect men both 
singularly and in the aggregate"? One may certainly question 
the legitimacy of the analogy; could one, for instance, 
speculate about the effect of taking knock-out drops while 
under the influence of knock-out drops? No, I do not say my 
analogy holds, but it may; and so, we avoid the certainty of 
paradox, if not the possibility. I shall now endeavor to 
guide you into the perspective of cybernetics.
3Cybernetics, as I shall present it, is concerned 
with describing the behavior of systems in terms of the 
states of those systems. This description of the behavior 
of a system is generally undertaken as a prelude to alter­
ing that system's behavior. Cybernetics, then, aims at the 
description of the behaviors of systems with respect to 
manipulatable parameters.
Wiener defines cybernetics as "the science of con-
p
trol and communication in the animal and the machine." I 
do not think it improper to extend this definition to other 
systems, e.g. plants, societies, populations, etc. Cyber­
netics is both particular and general. Attention is first 
focused upon a system, a particular system, defined in terms 
of its states, but then a search for generality takes place; 
that is, not one but all the possible behaviors of that 
system are sought. We thus ask for a general or complete 
description of the behaviors of a particular system. Cy­
bernetics seeks generality on another level in that it also 
attempts to elaborate a body of concepts suitable for talk­
ing about any system whatever.
Now, it is easy to see that information theory is a 
necessary part of cybernetics. Information theory is always 
concerned with a set of possibilities, not with individual 
events. Cybernetics, employing information theory, attempts
^See footnote 1. This is the subtitle of Wiener's 
book on cybernetics.
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to set up a way of describing all the possible behaviors of 
a particular system in terms of a language, or conceptual 
scheme, suitable for describing any system whatever.
How does cybernetics differ from older ways of.doing 
science? Cybernetics represents a new point of view, and so 
new problems naturally emerge. But there is more involved 
here. In addition to seeing new problems, there is an 
emphasis upon looking for different ways of structuring 
problems within this new perspective. Confronted with the 
phenomenon of a frog zygote developing into a mature frog, 
the classical scientist would ask how this development takes 
place. He will then look for intervening states, and, since 
he cannot immediately observe them all, he hypothesizes 
them, guided by some analogous mechanism from his experience 
in other situations. Gradually, a grand mechanical picture 
or model, which is said to represent the state of affairs 
under investigation, is built up. This model or theory is 
then subjected to tests to see if it can be verified. For 
instance, in our frog example, it might be hypothesized that 
both the concentration of chemical X in the water and 
changes in temperature will affect zygote development. It 
can be put somewhat like this: If chemical X is present
then the zygote becomes a cyclops, and if the temperature 
falls below 35°F the zygote becomes a tadpole, but change 
is arrested at this point. Both of these developments set
5off new searches for mechanisms to explain why these new 
phenomena are manifest, and so on.
Confronted with this same situation, the cybernetician 
will ask, "What are the possible states the zygote can go to, 
and what can I do to obtain one of these states?" His at­
tention is not focused upon a search for mechanisms or upon 
any attempt to reduce or explain what goes on here in terms 
of something else. His point of view is radically func­
tionalistic. He seeks to define initial and terminal states 
and to discover some operation performed, or condition im­
posed, on the initial state such that a specified terminal 
state is reached. Cybernetics looks at the wider set of 
possibilities that exists in a given system and asks how one 
particular possibility may be realized— what we have to do 
in order to bring a certain situation about. In this en­
deavor, little or no attention is given to the notions of 
necessary connection or driving force. It is, we might say, 
assumed that some kind of change will take place; the big 
question is "How do we control change— what must we do to 
insure a given final outcome?"
We might justly characterize the older scientific 
viewpoint as dealing with systems wherein causal connection 
or energy transfer is the fundamental concept. (The word 
"system" shall here mean a clearly delimited portion of the 
world in which we happen to be interested.) The well de­
fined properties exhibited by the system are just those
6responses to well defined changes In the surromdlngs in 
which we happen to be interested. It is, I think, accurate 
to say that these systems are energy-tight or energy-closed, 
closed either by disregarding certain energy leaks (ignoring 
friction and air resistance) or by compensating for, and 
minimizing, energy leaks (insulation, etc.).
Cybernetics, on the other hand (speaking loosely), 
may be said to be information-tight but open to energy.
That is, some sort of change is always presumed or expected. 
It is the possible ways that change can go that is of 
interest to cybernetics. The important thing is not energy 
transfer but information transfer. Just as the classical 
scientist wants to insure that no energy moves from one part 
of the system to another without his knowledge, so the 
cybernetician wants to determine all signals or information 
transfers within the system.
Cybernetics, in contrast to the energy oriented view­
point, has several advantages. Its concepts are perfectly 
general in that they are applicable to all branches of 
science; a chemical, physical, psychological or biological 
system can be described in the same language. Therefore, it 
offers a way of bringing diverse sciences into relation with 
one another without reducing one to another. In other 
words, the whole project of reductionism is side-stepped. 
Various areas of one special science may be shown to be
7isomorphic^ with respect to areas of another science. Thus 
it might be possible, if the human nervous system can be 
shown to be isomorphic with certain complex self-regulating 
servo-mechanisms, to infer expected human behaviors, from 
machine behaviors. It is important to notice that anyone 
committed to a reductionistic program would be unlikely to 
seek these kinds of isomorphic relationships.
One can proceed only so far toward understanding a 
point of view through general statements. I shall now turn 
to a specific exemplary problem; I shall try to show, step 
by step, how one can be led into the perspective of the 
general theory of systems.
Suppose that one day in my back yard I notice the 
following phenomenon. A spider has constructed a web such 
that there are four concentric bands connecting the radial 
filaments, as in the following diagram.
3See the discussion of isomorphism and homomorphism, 
P . 9.
8Suppose further that I have occasion, or indeed just decide, 
to observe this situation at some fixed interval for some 
fixed interval— say, every hour I look at the spider-web- 
system for five seconds. During the intervals while I am
actually watching the spider, he is always on one or the
other of the concentric bands, never in-between on a radial 
strand.
Suppose I now write down the number "one" when the
spider is on the innermost band; the number "two" when he is
on the next innermost band; and so on. In time I will have 
written down a long chain of numbers from which a matrix 
showing transition probabilities can be constructed. Let us 
now imagine that I simply sit down at a wireless telegraph 
and broadcast this chain of numbers, which I shall refer to 
as the protocol of the system. The question now arises:
What can someone who knows nothing of my circumstances make 
of this broadcast if he should chance to tune in?
Let us suppose that he extracts the following tran­
sition matrix from our number chain.
1 2 3 k
: 1 1/2 0 1/8 0
2 0 1/^ $/8 0
i 3 1/3 3/4- 0 1/2
; 1/6 0 1/2
Our listener might say that the matrix is descrip­
tive of a discrete-state machine operating under constraint 
and, therefore, in some measure, determinate. The terms 
"system" and "machine" have this relationship; a richly 
joined system, one that is determinate, or nearly so, is 
called a machine; and a loosely joined machine is called a 
system.
Suppose now that the listener takes it upon himself 
to construct a machine which will exhibit behavior capable 
of being described in the matrix he has constructed. Such a 
machine will be said to be isomorphic with whatever generated 
the first protocol. Such an apparatus might consist of 
various sets of coin tosses made according to certain rules.
The listener might also construct a transition matrix 
where states three and four of the original matrix are re­
garded as a single state. Such a matrix would look like 
this :
1 2 7
1 1/2 0 1/16
2 0 ^/h $/l6
7 1/2 3/^ V 8
If he constructed an apparatus which exhibited such a line 
of behavior then the apparatus would be homomorphic with the 
source of the transmitted variety. Altogether, fourteen 
matrices descriptive of machines homomorphic with the source
10
of the transmitted variety can be constructed. Of course, 
one of these is trivial. The complete lattice is shown on 
the following page (p. 11).
We see that one can order the kinds of simplifica­
tions of a given machine. After the first simplification, 
we see that state one (1) yields state one (1) and seven 
(7) with equal frequency. One might now find, after a 
further examination of the protocol, that if state seven has 
preceded state one, state one always goes in the next step 
to state one. That is, seven, one yields one, one. By 
recoding states so as to take account of previous states, 
we can sometimes discover a more determinate matrix. We 
might say that the system shows memory. Such a matrix might 
look like this:
11 12 17 21 71 22 27 72 77
11 1 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 0 0
12 0 1/2 0 0 0 1/2 1 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 1/k 0 0 0
21 0 0 1/2 0 0 /^U■ 0 0 0
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1





Now suppose I discover that, while an ultrasonic 
whistle is sounding, the spider moves to the first strand 
and remains there until the whistle ceases, whereupon it 
resumes its former behavior. Here, we have a machine input: 
whistle sounding or whistle silent. If I now shut off the 
whistle whenever the spider reaches the first strand, and 
turn the whistle on whenever the spider reaches the fourth 
strand, we have a system with feedback in which I am coupled 
to the spider-web-machine through the whistle-optic channels.
If we now suppose that our listener lives nearby and 
has.a dog that howls whenever he hears the whistle, the 
listener might notice that the dog's howling accompanies a 
change in the behavior of the wireless signal. He may set 
up a second matrix which describes the signal's transition 
probabilities when the dog howls. It might turn out to be:
1 2 3
1 . 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 3 A 0
3 0 0 0 1
If 0 0 1A 0
We can see that the system quickly goes to state one and 
remains there; one is now an absorbing state.
Our listener could, however, code the situation as:
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A1 A2 A3 B2 B3 b 4
A1 1/2 0 1/8 1 0 0
A2 0 ^/k V 8 0 0 0
A3 1/3 3/4 0 0 0 0
B2 0 0 0 0 7/8 0
B3 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bh 1/6 0 1/4 0 1/8 0
A = Whistle Silent B = Whistle Sounding
I have now introduced the notions of: (1) a de­
terminate machine (in this case, stochastic), (2) the machine 
with input, (3) the partially coupled system or interacting 
systems, (4) the fully joined system, or system with feed­
back, which can, by choice of variable coding, be treated as 
a simple determinate machine. I have also introduced iso­
morphism and homomorphism, made possible by simply recoding 
states. Finally, I have noted that a third type of recoding 
is possible, when we take into account previous states of a 
machine. If this kind of recoding makes the system more 
determinate in its behavior, we say the system shows memory.
So far we have made use of the notion of variety 
without explicitly attending to its importance. The very 
notion of communication, or information transfer, depends 
upon variety or, at any rate, upon the possibility of 
variety. Three other important notions can be introduced
l 4
through a brief discussion of variety— control, constraint, 
and uncertainty.
Let us suppose that my four wireless signals con­
sist of one, two, three, or four dots with a long interval 
between each signal. Also imagine that someone (S) wanted 
to interfere with my signal's ability to carry information 
without immediately arousing a possible listener's suspicion. 
If he also has a wireless key, he need only wait for my 
signal, and in all cases where I send less than four dots he 
reduces the variety in the channel to zero. He has robbed 
it of any capacity to carry information.
We view the situation as follows: Before S inter­
feres, the spider-web system (W) is a machine with output, 
the receiver (R) is a machine with input, and the wireless is 
a coupling (C), a machine with input and output.
When S Interferes, C has two inputs with S's input de­
termined by C's; thus, there is feedback from C to S.
W R
S keeps the output of C at R constant, thus acting as a 
control on R and a constraint on C; that is, S reduces the 
variety in C to zero. Note that S could impose lesser
15
constraint on C. He could, for instance, take no action 
when one dot is sent hut always add to two or three dots so 
that the signal adds up to four. Here the constraint im­
posed reduces the variety from two bits to one.
Before S intervened, the total variety transmitted 
by C could be described by two binary digits; the greatest 
amount of information that could be transmitted at one oper­
ation is two bits. It is now possible to introduce H— the 
basic information function— which is, variously termed, 
depending on use, the amount of either information, surprise, 
uncertainty, selection, or, generally, negative entropy. In 
our case, H shall specify uncertainty. We may think of un­
certainty as specifying the receiver’s expectation of 
guessing wrong about, a given message before it is sent. Un­
certainty (in bits p) is given by the formula H = % p  log2P 
and can never exceed the possible variety of the system, in 
this case, two bits. It will only equal this variety when 
each message is equally probable. Suppose that each state: 
one, two, three, or four dots, appeared equally often, 
then H =  .5+ *5+ *5+ . 5 = 2  bits— the variety in the 
system. If, however, the four different states appear with 
a frequency of .10, .1*+, .36, .40; then H [ .3322 + .3971 + 
.5306 + .5288] 1.7887. R's uncertainty is thus reduced by
approximately .2113 bits.
One last point: A channel can carry more than one
message. If the receiver notes the difference between
16
no signals and some signals then S would not interfere with 
the transmission of this information.^
I shall now endeavor to treat some metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical problems, more or less in the 
order mentioned here. We turn, first, to what can be called 
metaphysical problems.
In large measure, the ideas expressed in this 
chapter derive from the works of Norbert Wiener, Claud 
Shannon, and, most of all, W. Ross Ashby. For general ref­
erence consult the bibliography.
•CHAPTER II
SOME PROBLEMS FROM THE STANDPOINT 
OF CYBERNETICS
Lass dich die Bedeutung der Worte von ihren 
Verwendungen lehrenl (%hnlich kann man in der Mathematik 
oft sagen: Lass den Beveis dich lehren, was bewiesen
wurde.)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
We shall now consider the interrelated philosophical 
problems of freedom, substance, consciousness, certainty, 
and continuity. What if someone asked, "Are the states of 
the system we have been discussing free or determined?" It 
seems to me that the only way we can find a use for the 
terms "free" and "determined" is to pay careful attention to 
what system we are talking about.
In the coupled systems | W |-^| C antecedent
states of C are followed by subsequent states of R. One can 
say C determines R, but C is free with respect to R. Like­
wise, W is free with respect to C, and R is determined with 
respect to C. All of these subsystems are completely 
defined— they are defined in terms of their states. If 
someone asks, "Is W determined?" we can quite rightly reply,
17
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"No, of course not— we have not, up to now, connected ante­
cedent states in some other systems with subsequent states in 
W." (Note that we could just as well use the terms "cause" 
and "effect" here.)
In the last chapter we attended to only one kind of 
variety that a spider is capable of exhibiting— the way he 
moves about on a web. Let us substitute a man (M) for the 
spider. Suppose that our protocol was extracted from four 
different activities of a man; say he alternately laughs, 
talks, barks, and chews on a bone. If we now succeed in 
discovering a set of well defined antecedent states in the 
environment which precede each state the man exhibits, we 
can say that he is determined. We are here concerned about 
the man's coupling, on the one. hand, with his environment 
and, on the other, with the wireless. Thus. M is. defined in 
terms of his states. Someone might here exclaim, "But M so 
defined is not à man; you have selected out only a very 
minute portion of the enormous number of behavioral states a 
man might exhibit." I would reply, "Nevertheless, M is the 
site of the variety which concerns us— for our purposes, M 
is only that and nothing more. Also, for our purposes, M is 
now determined."
There is a related use we might make of "free" and 
"determined" here. We could think of a system as free when 
it exhibits maximum entropy— when the occurrence of each 
state is equally probable— when the system shows no
19
constraint. If M laughs, talks, barks, and chews on a bone 
in completely random fashion, we might say he is free.
It is important to notice that the quantity of 
variety in a system will depend on our coding. If we, for 
instance, define a man as living or dead then the variety 
will be one bit.
Suppose, however, we defined man according to the 
permutations of the firings of the cerebral neurons; as­
suming neuron independence, the figure is something like 
1 0(10 )J. Can I determine a given state among all of these?
Of course, I could achieve this by killing the individual 
involved. I can also reduce the variety by cutting out 
certain portions of the brain, but this act, one might say, 
alters the system and we do not have a man anymore. Here we 
could, with profit, employ the old skeptic's hair-splitting 
argument. The arbitrary character of our definition can be 
brought home when our questioner sees that his definition of 
a man depends upon the firing of one neuron. This procedure 
is, as always, absurd; we do not use the word "man" in this 
way.
But our questioner might have something else in 
mind— he might want to know if we can reduce entropy without 
altering the possible variety. We should observe, first of 
all, that maximum entropy cannot, as a matter of fact, occur 
in a human cortex. The cells are not totally independent of 
one another as to their firing. But, this aside, the
20
pertinent question is, "Can we functionally reduce entropy 
to zero in a human cortex— can we completely determine the 
sequence of firing of the neurons?" The answer is, ob­
viously, "No— not now at any rate."
In order that a system be able to determine another, 
the determining, or control, system must possess as much 
variety as the system controlled. Furthermore, control can 
only be effected if there is a channel which possesses the 
requisite variety, i.e., as much as the system to be con­
trolled. Now, the major difficulty in controlling the human 
cortex lies in the inadequacy of any channel. Even the 
largest computer possesses only a small fraction of the 
requisite variety for controlling the human cortex. But, 
let us turn now and work back to freedom by way of substance 
and consciousness.
At the outset of our investigation, one might have 
been prompted to ask: "Why did you happen to note just this
kind of variety in the spider's behavior? Why, for instance, 
did you not notice how he placed his feet or moved his 
fangs?" I am inclined to reply that I can give no final 
reason or rule here. In the end, I simply notice that some 
feature of a situation captured my attention (this I will 
call abstracting). I can, of course, offer hypotheses and 
may decide to accept one of them, but I could not operate 
here according to a rule. How, when the possibility of vari­
ation is infinite, can a rule be formulated in advance which
21
will specify what kind of variety will be attended to? The 
rule must cover all possibilities.
At any rate, one will grant that we always do notice 
certain aspects of a situation and that we do, indeed, note 
certain regularities concerning these aspects; this much was 
clear to Aristotle.^ In some sense, then, we always operate 
with black boxes. One can easily operate with the fact that 
a press on the buzzer brings the secretary without making 
any analysis of intervening aspects of the situation. If 
one were to become concerned with bells and electrical
 ^The term substance plays essentially the same role 
in this paper that it does in the philosophy of Aristotle. 
Aristotle said, in the Posterior Analytics. "It is necessary 
that there should be some unity that may be truly predicated 
of the many things" (I. 11), presumably because, from the 
Metaphysics. "Unless there were something over and above the 
individual things there would be no object of reason, but 
all things would be merely objects of sense" (II. h). 
Aristotle also said, "Of sensuous substances taken indi­
vidually there is neither definition nor proof possible, 
because they possess matter, and the nature of matter is 
such that it is possible for it to be, and, also, not to be" 
(Met. VI. 15)* But although neither definition nor proof 
is possible for sensuous substances, sensuous, or concrete, 
substances are the indwelling form in conjunction with 
matter (Met. VI. 11). Thus substance played a dual role in 
the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle's sensuous sub­
stances are simply given in experience— the indwelling 
forms present themselves. And the indwelling form must 
exist in order that there be an object of reason.
Aristotle's admonishment (Met. VIII. >+) that we 
seek proximate causes is also in agreement with the present 
work. When an explanation is called for, our explanation 
is to be given in terms of that which is proximately primi­
tive. For example, an adequate explanation of a dog's be­
havior may require a description of dog flesh; it does not 
require a description of prime matter. Likewise, in systems 
theory, a system is to be understood in terms of its im­
mediate states or subsystems, not in terms of some ultimate 
analysis. See also my reference to Aristotle's use of 
cause in Chapter Five.
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circuits, he would, first, be dealing with a different 
situation, and, second, at some level, still be dealing with 
black boxes. The elements of a system are for that system 
black boxes. We can take account of more aspects, but then 
we have a different system.
But it is not the black box of substance that most 
concerns us; it is the black box of consciousness. It seems 
to me that it is most beneficial to treat the problem of 
consciousness as a double-aspect problem, which may be 
loosely referred to as objective-subjective. First, let me 
develop the objective aspect. Here, I. will be considering 
persons other than myself.
It is difficult to separate the problem of "ab­
stracting" from what is done with abstractions; I have al­
ready said something about the former. That aspect of my 
discussion, in the last chapter, involving an observer- 
sender and a listener, was designed to enable me to separate, 
if only artificially, these problems. One is not as likely 
to ask, "Why do you distinguish among these four signals?" 
or "Why do you notice this signal?" as he is to ask, "Why 
did you notice that the spider behaved thus and so?" By 
focusing the discussion, for the time being, upon the 
listener, I can, perhaps, persuade you to consider only 
what can be done with abstractions, or perhaps you would 
prefer the term essences.
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For the listener, when the source of the variety is 
unknown, the machine under consideration is the machine-like 
behavior. The signals carry information to the receiver by 
eliminating possibilities or removing uncertainty. The sig­
nals mean something for the listener in that they reduce his 
uncertainty as to what is to follow. When one begins to 
receive information from different systems and notices con­
nections between these systems, as in our example when the 
listener both receives the wireless signal and hears the dog 
howl, new dimensions of meaning emerge; and the listener is 
able to connect one kind of variety with another. The dog’s 
howl now means that the electrical signal will shortly show 
a different pattern.
I hope you will see where this kind of thinking 
leads. The ’’man” one thinks about is a line of behavior 
together with what that line of behavior means for the ob­
server .^  It is easier to get a clear view here if we adopt 
an omniscient point of view with respect to the object and 
the subject.
Shannon’s law of requisite variety^ demands that if 
one system is to take complete account of another, the
“"See B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Croft, 1957) for an extended discussion of 
this point of view.
^For our purposes, the best discussion of Shannon’s 
law of requisite variety is that by W. Ross Ashby, ^  Intro­
duction to Cybernetics (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1966), pp. 202-18.
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accounting system must have as many states as the system 
accounted for. If our listener is to receive the signal then 
he must he thought of as a system capable of at least four 
states; if he is simultaneously to receive information 
through the dog channel, he must possess two additional 
states; and if he is to code the two as interacting systems, 
he must possess at least eight states. If I am to say that 
the signals mean anything for the listener, he must exhibit 
additional variety. He must show that he anticipates some 
future state of the signal on the basis of its present state.
As a system is able to map more and more fields of 
variety into itself, there exists the possibility that it 
may also map the inner-connections of these fields into 
itself. And always, it seems that such mappings of inter­
connections lead to a more determinate representation.
What then can individual (X) be for individual (Y)?
X is for y only those states of X mapped into Y together 
with what these states mean, in that they point to systems 
beyond X or affect how Y anticipates future states of X.
The statement, "X is conscious," means for Y that the system 
X is in a particular state; and if the sentence is to conyey 
any information, there must exist the possibility that X 
might be unconscious. The statement, "X's unconscious mind 
is not accessible to X's conscious mind," suggests to Y 
that one system of variety is not completely mapped into 
another. Y's model of X might be that of a system capable
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of mapping enormous quantities of variety into itself. In 
addition, a portion of the system not involved in this first- 
order mapping, maps, abstracts, and recodes a portion of the 
received variety. As a sidelight, we can point out that 
this model of man allows us to account for those feelings 
about other people for which we can give no reason. The 
first-order mapping is of a finer texture than the second- 
order mapping. Consequently, some of the variety is lost 
in the second-order mapping. How we feel may be considered 
as the result of first-order data processing. How we think 
may be regarded as the result of second-order data process­
ing. We know, as a matter of experience, that neither 
feeling nor reason is a sure guide to action where people 
are concerned. The failure of reason can be interpreted as 
due to a failure to make sufficient distinctions or judicious 
distinctions. The failure of feeling can be attributed to a 
lack of system coherence.
But what of the subjective aspect of consciousness? 
Can the consciousness of Y ever be the subject of that con­
sciousness? In the first place, for Y the statement, "I am 
conscious," carries no information— there is no possibility 
that Y could be conscious of the statement, "I am conscious," 
and at the same time, it be the case that Y is unconscious.
We note that Y can say nothing about Y ’s consciousness. 
Another person (X) might take Y ’s utterance as a symptom 
that Y is in the conscious state. And X might say to
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another individual (Z) that Y is conscious, and here, in­
formation is transferred.
We might, at this point, be interested in something 
other than the linguistic question; we might want to ask,
"Can an individual ever be conscious of the nature of his 
own consciousness?” According to our model of man, set 
forth here, this question is equivalent to "Can a system 
monitor itself completely?" From the standpoint of cy­
bernetics, this latter question can be answered with an 
unequivocal "NoI— the notion is contradictory to our model." 
According to the law of requisite variety, a monitor must 
possess as much variety as the system monitored, and if this 
is so, nothing would be left over to monitor the monitor 
circuits. system can at the same time be isomorphic with 
itself and take cognizance of that isomorphism. Of course, 
one part of a system may monitor another part, and so partial 
self-knowledge is not ruled out. The foregoing does not 
rule out the possibility that someone else might be able to 
take complete account of me— assuming that he can show more 
states than I.
Thus for me, my consciousness remains an essential 
secret. I cannot know what I am going to do next, if by 
this I mean know completely the next state I, as a system, 
will go to. This amounts to saying that for myself, I 
must remain undetermined or free— and this statement again 
says nothing when I say it to myself. There is no
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possibility that I might be determined. For another person, 
my consciousness indicates only some state I might be in or 
some subsystem organization associated with that state. If 
he is a sufficiently complex system and can take the proper 
read-offs, he might completely determine (predict) my 
actions. In practice, he must, however, work with some ex­
tremely crude homomorphic reduction, which is usually less 
adequate than the partial isomorphisms in my own "conscious" 
systems.
I shall attempt to deal with the problems of cer­
tainty and continuity by, first, constructing, on a broader 
scale and with less detail, a more complex model and, then, 
explicitly posting the observer outside the system; when I 
define a system according to its states, I had best not pay 
attention to myself when I do it. Let us suppose that we 
are watching system A take account of system B.
How can we give meaning to the statement, "System A 
takes account of system B"? After all, when we take account 
of B, we take account of only one abstract protocol emitted 
by B; even if for someone else it is capable of a greater 
degree of variety than for us, nevertheless, for us he is 
what we can abstract— what may be homomorphic for someone 
else will be isomorphic for us. The system will then, in 
some sense, always take "complete" account of the system 
monitored. Here, we come up against the most difficult 
problem for those who opt for phenomenology— the world is in
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every case my world. The problem is how do we account for 
the fact that we realize that we may be wrong?
Suppose that A and B both monitor a third system C.
A and B both encode C in the same way— they make the same 
distinctions with respect to C. A has enough states to map 
C in the same way B does. By way of digression, and in ad­
dition, A is so constructed that second-order monitoring 
circuits map the entire encoded protocol of C so that C is 
treated as one of several subsystems.
Let us suppose that C is a chicken. A's map of the 
chicken will include many, many states which the chicken can 
go to. In addition, there will be ways in which chickens 
differ from each other.
Suppose A.'s map of these different chickens (say C,
D, and E) is as follows:
C D E
UVMXY UVWXZ U7WXR
A can code C, D, and E as states of a larger system, say Q;
and Y, Z, and R indicate states of Q.
Let U, V, W, and X be variables which have a range of 
two states— U, for instance, can be U* or U". U* might be 
wings extended, U" wings closed, and this kind of variation 
is possible to all three chickens. Let Y, Z, and R stand 
for colors— white, red, and black, respectively. Wing- 
flapping is a state of C; being white, red, or black is a 
state of Q. In each case the system is defined in terms of 
what is free to vary.
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There is also a protocol of B mapped into A, and 
this includes B in the presence of C— the entire range of 
B's responses to change of state in C. For A, B and C are 
now one determinate machine. When we say A takes account 
of B, it is the encoded protocol and nothing more that is 
accounted for. A might also possess sufficient states to 
map other systems very similar to B in the same way he has 
done in the case of C; B, R, and S might form a system. A 
can now take wider account of B with respect to a larger 
system.
If there is no feedback from B to A and if B's re­
sponses in no way affect A, then it is senseless to speak 
of A being in error with respect to B. But it is almost 
always the case that B will in some way feed back into A, 
and what if A's map is wrong? The present map A has of B 
is never wrong as far as A is concerned. But, A can say 
that his map of B is possibly wrong, and this simply means 
that B may emit an unexpected response. This problem re­
quires for its solution that there be a third-level feedback 
loop in A which maps cases of being right and wrong about 
systems. A's map of B now includes B changing its states 
X, Y, Z, and W, for example; but also, B's not showing 
these states. Alternately, where these states are not 
shown, the system under consideration is called not-B. One 
might even say that for A, B has broken down.
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The point is, absolute certainty applies only to 
models or, if you prefer older terminology, forms, es­
sences, or abstractions. This does not eliminate the pos­
sibility that someone may, in fact, be certain even though 
he entertains the notion that he might be uncertain.
The problem of how the matter of continuity might 
arise in a finite-state machine is very similar to how the 
notion of certainty is so mapped. Suppose one watches a 
stick being cut in half and one of these pieces again 
halved and so on. First-order mapping takes account of 
sticks and their states wherein finite numbers of cuts are 
made. Second-order circuits map these maps; third- and 
fourth-order mapping describes the possibility of future 
cuts and takes cognizance of this possibility. Continuity, 
thus, is a feature of high-level mapping— it is a part of 
the grid we place on the world, and, of course, the grid 
itself is our world; only for someone else is it a grid 
placed on the world.
This, then, is our map of man: He is an enormously
complex, finite-state machine wherein first-order maps are 
mapped in turn into second-order maps, as in our example of 
the chickens. But there are many different kinds of second- 
and third-order maps arising from those of lower order. The 
system cannot in principle take account of itself completely. 
This is our way of accounting for the fact that our
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knowledge is determinate, that one takes account of un­
certainty, and that we are essentially free.
While a good case can be made for the assertion 
that all problems of philosophy have both a metaphysical and 
an epistemological aspect, it is, nevertheless, easier to 
deal with most philosophical problems as though only one 
aspect were involved. In Chapter Three, the focus will 
shift toward problems of knowledge— the orientation is more 
"inward" than is that of the present chapter. A similar 
perspectival shift occurs between Chapters Four and Five.
CHAPTER III 
LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS
expression is the need of my soul 
i was once a vers libre bard 
but i died and my soul went into the body 
of a cockroach 
it has given me a new outlook upon life 
i see things from the underside now
Don Marquis
Our whole conception of how one man exists for 
another— that for X, Y exists as the encoded protocol of a 
line of behavior— involves us in some interesting linguistic 
considerations. The signals which X picks up concerning Y 
carry information in that they render more determinate 
either the model X has of Y or what state Y is actually in.
X is informed by the signals in that the signals eliminate 
possibilities. The signals mean something to X in that he 
can by linking his model of Y with other models he has en­
coded, or by linking states of Y, reduce his uncertainty 
about what is to follow. The signals can inform and have 
meaning only because they are interpreted or fitted into 
some pattern. Information has to do with making a particular
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model more determinate. Meaning has to do with how this 
determination in one model affects determination in others.
Suppose, for instance, we know that Smith, Jones, or 
Thompson is a dope peddler. We learn that Jones is not a 
dope peddler. The second statement is informative; it re­
duces our uncertainty. The two statements together mean 
that either Smith or Thompson is a dope peddler.
Meaning is absolutely dependent on context. When we 
have learned the meaning of a word we have learned an entire 
system of symbols. And in addition to a linguistic context, 
an extra-linguistic context is also present when we make use 
of an expression. The notion of use is inextricably inter­
woven with meaning. Another way of expressing ourselves 
here is to say that meaning has to do with a system's 
orientation toward other systems. Symbols are of use to a 
relatively stable system, like a man, in that they enable 
the system to maintain stability. Communication can now be 
thought of as a process wherein one system orients another 
system. Words and other signals thus become, in their 
primary function, operators. Consider the following ex­
ample where one system orients another:
Suppose a child walks into my garage and asks me, 
"What is the use for that tool?" Wow, suppose further that 
the tool he is inquiring about is used for things with 
which he is totally unfamiliar. In this case, I can show 
him all the ways I use the tool by using it in various
3^
operations. The child can now practice these operations for 
himself, and when he can use the tool in all the ways I have 
shown him he knows as much about its use as I do. It is 
almost as though I had taken him by the hand and led him 
through a segment of forest pointing out various landmarks, 
and soon he is able to find his way about in this section 
of the woods as well as I. Of course, if the child in ques­
tion already knows something about the adjacent territory, 
he will be able to make better "use" (in a wider context) 
of what I am showing him. Now suppose I show him a relief 
model of the landscape we are traversing and attempt to 
employ this model as a learning aid, and suppose he does not 
see the connection. Perhaps the model is too rough. (And 
here, perhaps, is a way we can come to understand the most 
primitive use for the word intelligence.)
The situation of the child in the garage is quite 
similar. He, at the end of our training sessions, provided 
I am successful, will be able to find his way about, to 
operate with a set of objects. He can, in like manner, be 
taught to operate with certain words. Suppose in our train­
ing session I have made use of some diagrams, and have 
taught the child likewise to make use of them. Will he or I 
be disturbed because a section of the garage floor has been 
used to draw a map of the garage? Will he insist that my 
map on the floor will need, for its completeness, to show 
within it the position of the map, and this second-order map
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to show a map and so on? What have these second- and third- 
order maps got to do with the use of the map? They certainly 
do not help us in locating the first map. Of course, it is 
possible that a second-order map could have a use. In ranger 
stations we do see marked upon the map the position of the 
station. A second-order map could serve this function, 
namely, to show us where we are. If someone were to ask,
"How do I use this Map?" he would think it absurd if I drew 
him a map of the map. It is much the same with the meaning 
of the word "meaning." If someone asks, "What is the mean­
ing of 'meaning'?" I need not stand there puzzled by the 
form of the expression and attempt, as it were, to give a 
map of the map. I can simply try to show him how the word is 
used, and I do this by means of analogies, models, demon­
strations, and so forth. It may be that I will not succeed 
in showing the uses of this word to my questioner simply be­
cause he already knows those uses that I put before him, and 
in this case he will often not be able to see that he has 
asked the most useless question in the world. Perhaps the 
hardest job in the world is that of showing someone that he 
has indeed asked a useless question. It is similar to the 
case where one asks, while holding a map in his hand, "Where 
are the directions for finding the map? They are not here."
In Chapter One, the notion of control was discussed 
in conjunction with the diagram:
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0-0-0
The output of C at R remains constant due to the interven­
tion of S through the feedback loop C-S. Suppose that our 
source of variety (W) is a thug whose input signal at C is a 
set of knife thrusts which if not interrupted will increase 
your surface area beyond accepted limits. S now becomes 
your control center whose inputs at C are your possible 
counter actions. Since S requires a finite time in which to 
select the appropriate counter action, S may not possess the 
requisite variety if all its information is obtained at C. 
If, however, there exists another channel from W to S (let 
us say that you watch the position of the thug's feet), part 
of the work of selecting the appropriate response is done 
before W's signals reach C, and, now, perhaps S will possess 
the requisite variety for maintaining stability in R.
0\S
R
Verbal communication is closely akin to the situ­
ation where the thug inadvertently signals with his feet. 
Verbal signals affect the control center; they affect its 
orientation. It is also possible that one system can bring
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about an entire rearrangement of another so that different 
patterns of data interpretation are set up. This is some­
thing which the system acted upon cannot in principle antici­
pate the nature of. This kind of indirect communication is,
from my point of view, philosophy. As Wittgenstein says,
1
philosophy "leaves everything as it is." There are no facts 
of philosophy; philosophy has to do with our frame of 
reference.
A short discussion of conflict theory will at this 
point serve two purposes. First, it will enable the reader 
to acquire familiarity with the way of thinking about the 
nature of communication and language implicit in our general 
systems image of man. Secondly, conflict theory will make 
our discussion of meaning, from a general systems point of 
view, easier to grasp.
Let us suppose that Leroy and Elwood are playing a 






The rules of the game are: Elwood selects a row; he has two
possible choices. Row A or Row B. Then, Leroy selects a
Ludwig Wittenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1965)»
p. -^9®, para. 12h.
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column, either X or Y. The intersect of the row and the 
column is the outcome of the encounter. Let us assume that 
Leroy desires the outcome (1). If he has knowledge of 
Elwood's choice, he can always insure the outcome of (l).
Suppose now that Leroy must specify in advance what 
his strategy will be in response to any move Elwood makes.
If Leroy's aim is to secure a minimum of outcomes, if he 
wants to reduce the variety, then he will specify X in re­
sponse to A and Y in response to B. If, however, we in­
crease the choices open to Elwood, as in the following game, 








We see that Leroy does not possess the requisite variety to 
completely control the outcomes. The best he can do, where 
no rows have identical elements, is to hold Elwood to an 
outcome of 2 or Of course, if both 2 and are accept­
able outcomes, then Leroy's control is sufficient unto the 
problem thereof.
The key to a general understanding of conflict 
theory can be grasped by noting how a chess master beats a 
computer at the game of chess. He wins by complicating the
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game to the point where the computer cannot cope with all 
the variety.





0 cannot move to block the double threat; he does not possess 
the requisite variety: he has only one move whereas two are 
required. Thus a system must possess requisite variety with 
respect to information, data processing, and response po­
tential. If overloading occui's at any stage, the system can 
no longer maintain control.
Enough has been said about conflict theory to show 
its relevance with respect to the notions of uncertainty and 
information as they bear on the transactions a system has 
with its environmnent. Conflict theory also points the way 
to an understanding of how the meaning of our expressions 
are rendered determinate. Briefly, our problem in communi­
cation is limitation of outcome. The meaning of signals 
cannot be divorced from their use. In fact, when we have 
taught someone the uses we have for an expression, we have 
taught him its meaning.
There is an intimate connection between the two 
statements: "For me other men are machines," and "Can
machines think?" Subsequent discussion will demonstrate
^0
this relationship. There are four important objections to 
the legitimacy of the expression "Machines think." First, 
there is an ethical objection— is it good for men to think 
this way? Second, there is what I shall call Godelism.^
The objection here is that a machine cannot exercise inde­
pendent thought, or cannot think thoughts which are not 
those of the programmer. The third kind of objection is that 
the machine cannot be self-conscious. The fourth objection 
is appropriately labeled Ryleism. Here, it is maintained 
that to say machines think is a category mistake, a violation 
of ordinary usage. Let us take Ryleism first.
Can machines think or feel? Would we ever be in­
clined to say of a machine that it thought or felt? Is it 
logically possible for a machine to think? This last ques­
tion draws attention to the critical issue. If I say, 
"Machines can't think," and I mean by this that nothing could 
count as evidence that a machine thought, I have, by a se­
mantic decision, rendered it impossible for the expression 
"the machine thought . . ." to function in our language. It 
is a violation of protocol to use "machine" and "thought" in 
this way. It is a violation of a formation rule— which can 
now be called a rule since it has been made explicit. The
I do not mean to imply that GSdel himself ever gave 
any thought to what is discussed here; only that what his 
proof seems to imply has been used by others to formulate a 
position. See J. R. Lucas, "Minds, Machines and Godel,"
Minds and Machines, ed. Alan Ross Anderson (Englewood Cliffs; 
Prentice-Hall, 19&4), pp. ’+3-59*
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expression, "The machine thought that it was in love but 
didn't feel that way," is, after our rule has been ex­
plicitly posited, not a well-formed formula, and this is why 
we can say that it is logically impossible for machines to 
think.
But what if no such rule has been set forth?
Doesn't the use of "machine" in the expression, "The machine 
thought," seem strange anyway? We might say here that this 
expression violates customary usage, but how do we determine 
what customary usage is? "It seems jto me that this expression 
violates usage." Doesn't this statement seem a little arbi­
trary and self-centered?
I could also make the statement, "Russians do not 
think," into a "necessarily" true proposition. . I simply de­
cide to use some other expression, or expressions, besides 
"think" when I talk about Russians. Where someone else 
might say, "Tolstoy thought that he had won the game," I 
might say, "Tolstoy exhibited a positive anticipatory re­
sponse set at one point in the game," or some other such 
expression. Does it not seem strange to use two different 
sets of expressions with respect to Russians and other 
people? But— hold on— who said Russians are people? If I 
were to adopt the procedure of not using "thought" with re­
spect to Russians, I might feel some inclination to alter 
the usage of other terms when I talk about Russians.
^2
When you say, "Machines can't think,” exactly what 
are you telling me? Are you saying something about machines 
or something about the way you use language? If it turns out 
that nothing can count as evidence against the statement, 
then you have simply told me something about your language 
habits. Sometimes it takes a little while to find out if 
someone is "telling” or "showing"— telling us something 
about the world or showing us something about himself.
If someone says, for example, that "widespread, un­
provoked violence is not exhibited in any society," we 
might, at first, think he is saying something about society. 
But upon reflection, we discover that we, ourselves, would 
not call any group of people a society if there were wide­
spread, unprovoked violence exhibited. We find that our 
speaker has not only told us how he uses words, but that we 
agree with him in that usage. There is, then, basic agree­
ment at the pragmatic level where usage is established in­
formally. We can also agree to prescribe a given usage.
This is agreement at the semantic level. This usage we take 
as saying something about machines. If we do not agree with 
this usage, we say it tells us something about the speaker.
In point of fact, however, in this particular case, we have 
some feelings of puzzlement. For a long time, we have used 
the word "think" with respect to certain forms of complex 
behavior exhibited by people. It just happens that no 
other things around us exhibit these complex behaviors. We
3^might say that a dog "thought,” but even here we seem 
puzzled. Is asking, "Can a dog think?" a question about 
dogs or about linguistic usage? At any rate, we have 
usually reserved the term "thought" for people.
Until the present time, there has been little trouble 
with the use of the word "thought," since no other organism 
except man exhibited the complex behavior that we refer to 
when we say so and so thinks. But now machines have begun 
to exhibit complex behavior which makes some people want to 
say they think. The trouble is "our linguistic habits are 
out of joint." A distinction is called for where one was 
heretofore not needed. In James' example of the men who 
argued over whether or not the man goes round the squirrel, 
we have something similar.^ Once James showed that, while 
we normally do not have to distinguish between circumnavi­
gating an object and being at different times oriented 
toward its different sides, we see that here a distinction 
is called for. Two different usages which have in the past 
accompanied each other have to be separated.
I have so far pointed out that; (1) We can, by a 
semantic decision, make it logically impossible for a ma­
chine to think. (2) I have also indicated that we would 
not feel too uncomfortable with this decision because our 
actual linguistic habits have not been offended— we have not
^William James, "What Pragmatism Means," Essays in 
Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell (New York, London: Hafner
Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 1^ -1-58.
in the past used "think" and "machine” together. (3) I have 
further indicated that it would seem odd to us if someone 
said that "Russians don't think" and have indicated that 
this is due to established language habits. (^) I have said 
that in the case of dogs, as with recent machines, we waver. 
(5) Finally, I have indicated that we do waver in our usage 
because the kinds of behavior exhibited by dogs, and some 
complex machines, overlap the behavior range of man— at 
least, to some extent. In connection with this, I have said 
that James' squirrel problem can help us to see that the 
overlapping of spheres of usage is the cause of our trouble. 
Now what if the range of a machine's behavior exactly over­
lapped man's?
Suppose we could construct a mechanical man whose 
skin, eyes, etc., were indistinguishable from a man's. Sup­
pose further that he had all the facial expressions right—  
in short, that we could not in any way distinguish this 
machine from a man either by behavior or appearance. I have 
no doubt that we would say the "man(?)" thought, and even if 
we knew that it was mechanical, in time we would either 
say, "Of course machines think," or possibly "Some machines 
are men," which is another possible linguistic adjustment 
we could make. Or suppose that we were to remove most of a 
man's cortex and install radio control equipment wired di­
rectly to the sensory and motor nerves of the brain. If 
this equipment were in contact with a big enough computer.
^5
say one the size of a medium-sized house, we could probably 
get people to say that the individual so controlled thought, 
but they would probably abandon this usage if the situation 
were explained.
It seems that what we ^  say about "thinking" or, 
indeed, most any word, depends upon customary usage and that 
what we might say depends on what definitions, semantic de­
cisions, we make. One wants to say that at least the law of 
contradiction stands firm— of course it does: it is a
formation rule of logic. "One cannot 'logically* hold con­
tradictory opinions." Of course not— this is precisely the 
point. Contrast the law of contradiction with the "neces­
sarily" true hypothetical statement, "If A is the cause of B 
then A precedes B." This statement "feels" just as true to 
me as the law of contradiction.
We can definitively undermine Rylean objections to 
the expression "machines think." First, we note that while 
conformity to ordinary usage is necessary for communication, 
there is also embodied in ordinary linguistic usage a pro­
cedure for changing some one or more features of usage. If 
I say, "Let us henceforth use the term 'think' in conjunc­
tion with machine," then if people agree to this usage there 
is no possibility of a Rylean objection, for the expression 
now conforms to ordinary usage. And, there is no need to 
justify, in general, the process of altering customary
6^usage; it is simply a fact that this procedure is used, and 
furthermore, customarily used.
Alternately, what if I say, "let us think of men as 
machines," and other people agree to this usage. Now the 
Ryle people will have a difficult decision to make. Either 
"think" will no longer be legitimately used with "man" and, 
for all practical purposes, have no use whatever, or 
"machines think" will become a legitimate expression.
As I have already said, arguments against the le­
gitimacy of the statement "the machine thinks," which are 
associated with Godel’s proof, are arguments designed to 
show that a machine cannot think what is not programmed 
into it or that human thought is essentially different from 
machine thought. It is my belief that the subsequently pre­
sented argument is one big category mistake. The argument 
runs like this:
I. Any deductive system which is both consistent 
and rich enough to produce arithmetic contains at least one 
formula not provable in the system. Nevertheless, we can 
see that these formulae are true.
II. It is maintained that any machine which is 
complex enough to be suspected of thought is an instantia­
tion of a formal deductive system, obviously containing 
simple arithmetic since it can do simple arithmetic. It 
follows that since we can see that some formulae, unprovable 
in such a system, are obviously true, and since the machine
7^
is no more comprehensive than its deductive system, human 
thought is essentially different from anything a machine 
might do.
In the first place, I will point out that even if we 
accept this characterization of a machine, this "essential" 
difference is something very trivial. What we can contem­
plate, in all its splendor (and which the poor machine 
never can), is the formula which says, "This formula is un­
provable in this system."
What is of much more importance, however, is the 
fact that this conception of a machine is completely wrong. 
The conception of the machine held by the Godelians is that 
it is completely determined in its operations by a set of 
rules and that what it does will always be something def­
inite and discrete because anything indefinite would not be 
machine-like. Well, is this not the very model of a machine 
which I have been holding up for you all along? How, you 
may well ask, can I escape the conclusions so rigorously 
deduced from our conception of a machine and Godel's 
theorem?
It is fortunate, indeed, that I am defending cyber­
netics as a metaphysical principle; only this makes a 
defense possible. Suppose you are playing chess and you, 
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Suppose your opponent offers to bet you five hundred dollars 
that he can checkmate you in two moves, and you, after check­
ing the position, accept. Later, as you are writing out your 
check for five hundred dollars, you might begin to have some 
valuable thoughts. After all, it is hoped that you will get 
something for your m oney.•
Or, suppose that someone offers to bet you two 
thousand dollars against one thousand that he can beat a 
"fair" roulette wheel. You agree that he is to play the 
wheel for one hour, and at the end of that time if he is 
ahead you pay; otherwise, he pays. Are you smart if you ac­
cept this bet? A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
\lhite plays: pawn to king eight, rook; black any;
white castles (using rook on king eight), checkmate.
9^
Experiences of this type can lead one, after a time, 
to construct models of a different type. You include in 
your model of the situation the possibility that there is 
something you have not seen. You learn caution— like the 
Greeks with their possible "God unknown," you consider the 
possible "state" or "variable unknown."
While I abstract models from situations, the point 
of the above discussion is that the model may be incomplete.
I have already explained elsewhere how our cybernetics model 
of man makes this possible. Even if I built a machine con­
structed to operate according to certain rules, still I in­
clude in my model the possibility of the unexpected. Suppose 
the machine surprises me— well, then I will construct another 
model of it, a different abstraction. •
We act the same when dealing with a man or a 
mechanism. We construct a model, but our model, if we have 
much experience with life, also has room for the unexpected; 
we realize that we may have to modify our model. My world is 
in every case my world— it is as I see it. This is all very 
true, but my world is a very contingent world. Although I 
am certain of my own ideas, as my ideas, I am also certain 
that the possibility exists that I will not have the same 
ideas tomorrow; this is an undeniable fact. But then, isn't 
Husserl right after all? Maybe we do intuit essences which 
are there for everyone. How can we entertain the notion 
that someone else abstracts a different model from a given
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situation? Can we imagine his seeing the situation in some 
way in which we do not see it? We must say "yes" and "no" 
here.
Any definite model which we can attribute to someone 
else must, of course, be one we possess; but we learn, if we 
live long enough, to expect "our world" to change. It is an 
undeniable fact; Descartes would say that "'I think, hence I 
am’ is true every time I pronounce it." Yet, in a way, I 
can entertain the possibility that from some completely 
alien frame of reference even this pronouncement may be 
nonsense.
The G*(5delians are held captive bv an idealized 
Picture of a computer working exactlv as the designer planned 
for it to work. They would see things more clearly if they 
began by considering a servo-mechanism instead of a computer.
Suppose that X has devised a way of reading Y's 
thoughts and that he is able to derive a set of rules which 
perfectly predict Y's behavior. Has X thereby robbed Y of 
that something special; has X stolen Y ’s mind? Does it 
follow that X can now rely on the set of rules which he has 
formulated about Y and feel perfectly confident that Y will 
never surprise him? If he has lived his entire life in the 
academic world, he might think so; but anyone with any 
practical intelligence will know that X must always keep 
open the possibility that he may be surprised. This is not 
only true of humans but of machines as well. But, when we
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are surprised, what do we do? We build another model; we 
are made that way— it's in our hardware.
What now about the problem of consciousness? I 
have already shown that our cybernetics image of man reveals 
consciousness as it refers to someone else— to his be­
havioral states. Here, we can use consciousness to label 
the behavior of a machine. Someone might ask me at this 
point, "Keaton, don't you feel a little strange saying, 'a 
machine is conscious?'" Suppose I reply, "Yes, I do feel 
strange." But, is this feeling anything more than something 
occasioned by my linguistic habits? Suppose a child grew up 
in a world where machines behaved in many ways like men.
Would he not say, "Of course, machines are conscious," and 
think nothing of it.
If these responses do not satisfy you, let us try 
another way. Suppose I were to ask you, "How do you know 
other people are conscious— that they have that feeling of 
consciousness?" Can you give me satisfactory criteria for 
determining if another person is conscious and feels?
Let me suggest the following: Imagine that I can
predict every action of someone else— that I can calculate 
his reactions in advance. Also, I have completely elaborated 
a model of him and have programmed a computer so that it is 
isomorphic with the system I consider him to be. Now, sup­
pose that I can take direct read-offs— that I am literally 
wired up to both the individual and the computer, and in
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each case, whether I am attending to the man or computer, I 
feel or experience sensations which are in perfect agreement 
with the report of the "person(?)'* under observation. In 
what way can it now make sense to say I do not experience 
what he experiences? If you were to deny these criteria as 
adequate then how can "experience what he experiences" have 
any meaning? I feel sure that most people would accept ray 
criteria, and if they do, how could they avoid accepting 
the same criteria if a machine were the subject of an in­
vestigation? The point here is that any criteria which 
would be capable of establishing that another man thought or 
could feel would also be capable of establishing that a 
machine could feel. And once we have criteria, the whole 
thing becomes, in principle, an empirical matter.
Of course, even if we someday have the technology to 
test both man and machines by these criteria and if it is 
discovered that men can pass and no machine can, this will 
not obviate the fact that men of our times do, in fact, act 
as though other men are, with the qualifications I have made 
earlier, determinate machines.
The ethical objection derives its force from one of 
the most fundamental concepts of cybernetics itself— the 
concept of feedback. Briefly, the objection is that the 
widespread acceptance of the general systems image of man 
will disrupt that system which we call society. Is social 
life possible when man is viewed as a determinate machine?
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An answer to this question can best be attempted after we 
have considered just what is the nature of society when con­
sidered as a system. This is the subject of the fourth 
chapter.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL SYSTEMS: ITS SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS
Fig. 1
Give the party you suspect the above figure and 
ask him to pick out a form from it.
If he pick [sic] out either of the two crosses 
below (Fig. 2) you may accept him as a friend, but 





What will be the likely effect of the general systems 
way of thinking upon society? Is positing general systems 
theory self-vitiating? If the general systems point of view 
is neither logically nor practically self-vitiating, then is
5^
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it a way of thinking that is desirable, and if desirable, 
by what criteria? Finally, aside from these questions, will 
we be able to keep this mode of thought from eventually 
dominating our society?
Before we attempt an answer to these questions, let 
us consider the psychological, philosophical, and historical 
antecedents of the general systems mode of thought. Psy­
chologically, the systems view may be thought of as growing 
out of the causal view. At some time in most everyone's 
intellectual development, it will seem crystal clear that 
everything must have a cause; he will reason in terms of 
cause and effect. He may come to justify this reasoning as 
a habit of mind, as a necessary way in which the mind struc­
tures experience, or as an inherent, efficacious principle 
operative in the world. A person may, however, be led to 
modify his thinking when he begins to consider the notion of 
multiple causation. A causal explanation of a specific 
instance of deviant behavior given by a behavioral psychol­
ogist, a psychoanalyst, a sociologist, an anthropologist, 
and a physiologist may have almost no resemblance to each 
other. One can think of many instances from his own ex­
perience where causal explanations from different perspec­
tives have cast a pall of confusion over an issue.
One of three courses is usually followed at this 
point. First, one can reaffirm his faith in causality and, 
while realizing that all the explanations offered may be
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Inadequate, nevertheless, decide to act upon the hypothesis 
that one of them is adequate. He acts simply because in 
some circumstances action, of some sort is called for. On 
the other hand, one may say that perhaps all these causal 
explanations, offered in terms of different interpretational 
systems, are translatable one into the other. He may assume 
the possibility of isomorphism among systems. The tendency 
to indulge in this latter response is weakened in anyone who 
knows about that interesting little development in physics 
called "equivalence of systems." Finally, one can say, 
"Well, all explanation is relative to our projects"; specu­
lation is dismissed with that shop-worn catchword, "Every­
thing is relative."
Another kind of response is possible when, for 
instance, I look at a tree. I can think of it as a bio­
logical system. I can imagine the flow of water through 
the xylum tissue; I can imagine the flow of sugar in solu­
tion through the phlom; I can visualize the exchange of 
carbon dioxide molecules from the atmosphere to the leaf 
surface. Do I even need the notion of cause here at all? 
Likewise, when I encounter someone who behaves in an ab­
normal fashion, I can visualize a dynamic system engaged in 
an ongoing process wherein most of the activities are 
repetitive in nature. I don't need cause here either. 
Alternatively, I can think of the tree as an element in its 
own biome and of the complex interaction of parts within an
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ecological system. The shift of perspective here is ac­
complished by focusing on organization of entities rather 
than attributes of entities. The tree is an entity when we 
do ecology; the tree is a system when we do plant physiology. 
But surely, one wants to say, the tree is the same thing no 
matter who looks at it. Remember, for us the relevant 
thing is a line of behavior. For the physiologist, the tree 
will exhibit a line of behavior. For the ecologist, the 
tree is a variable, or state, in some line of behavior.
"But how," someone may ask, "is what you say about 
the systems approach different from the 'every causal expla­
nation is relative' view?" This variety of causal perspec­
tive is indeed the closest, of those discussed, to the general 
systems theory, but there are three important differences. 
First, as already pointed out, general systems does not even 
employ the notion of cause. Second, from the outset our at­
tention is directed to a system and not toward the perspec­
tive of the onlooker. The orientation is objective. not 
subjective; we are concerned with what we see, not with how 
it affects us. This difference is crucial; it is, for me, 
the difference between the objective and subjective points 
of view. And from the general systems point of view, the 
subjective response would here involve one in impossible dif­
ficulties. The "inward gaze" may be far better "than the 
Classics in paraphrase,""* but it involves the perceiving
^From Ezra Pound's "Hugh Selwyn Mauberley," ("Life 
and Contacts").
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system in endless, repeating feedback loops which tend to 
disorganize the system. Whatever system we look at, we had 
best not attend to ourselves when we look.
Third, we do not attempt to explain either how it is 
that certain kinds of systems present themselves to us or why 
it is that one perspective engages us. It is here that we 
opt for empiricism. This is the level of brute fact; certain 
things force themselves upon our attention. Even if we were 
to indulge in explanation here, the brute fact that certain 
features stand out is absolutely crucial; as Whitehead said, 
"I'm here and you’re there and there is no getting around 
that."
Our preliminary question, "How can society be char­
acterized as a system?" can now be answered. All we have to 
do is look and see. Metaphysically, we can decide to view 
some aggregate of people as a society and give general ex­
planations after the fact in terms of system theory; but are 
there features of any aggregates of people which force them­
selves upon us, and, more important, can we set forth a 
particular system which will predict rather than merely 
explain? If we are to have anything beyond explanation, we 
must clearly delimit elements and social facts. This latter 
has to do with making a science— explanation characterizes 
metaphysics; prediction characterizes science.
It is quite obvious that the elements of a society 
are people, and no one doubts that people interact; hence.
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we are forced to conclude that there are social facts. A 
task of fundamental importance is characterizing society and 
social facts. This is, of course, largely the task of the 
sociologist, but I would like to think that "enlightened" 
speculation, such as I shall exhibit in the concluding 
chapters of this essay, will be of some value to sociologists 
in their quest for social facts.
Philosophically, cybernetics may be regarded as a 
fusion of three dominant currents of western thought—  
rationalism, empiricism, and nominalism. Rationalism is 
given its due in the realization that our models are ab­
solutely determinate. Empiricism is satisfied in the 
realization that for us these models are unquestionably 
facts. Finally, nominalism enters the picture when we for­
mulate a model of a system modeling yet another system. We 
then see that for us an entirely different model might well 
have been extracted, and yet, we also see that the limita­
tions of the accounting system preclude its extracting any 
other model. When we see all this, we are led to entertain 
the notion that for us the situation may well be the same. 
Except for this nominalistie aspect of systems theory, it 
would almost exactly accord with the position of Alfred North 
Whitehead. Whitehead emphasizes the organismic and holistic 
approach to philosophy, but his insistence on the whole 
rather than a whole, delimited with some purpose in mind, 
shows his predilection for rationalism. For cybernetics.
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there Is no fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The concrete, 
or, better, the discrete, is in every case simply the units 
of a system, and if we in turn look at these units as sys­
tems then they are no longer concrete. But does not this 
view lead to utter conceptual chaos? No, we are saved be­
cause we note that certain systems are presented to us.
There is this character of givenness to experience. But 
then, how do we escape essentialism "a la Husserl”? Well, 
we say, "It does seem that certain systems naturally present 
themselves to us, and.as far as we can judge, if such judg­
ments make sense, they are pretty much the same for every­
one." But we hasten to add that there are, in every case, 
differences; and, anyway, things just happen to be this 
way— they need not be.
Cybernetics* temporal, although perhaps not genetic, 
antecedents lay in the thinking of economists, biologists, 
sociologists, and psychologists. Thomas Maithus' famous 
essay on population depicts an error-guided, self-regulating 
system. It is common knowledge that Maithus* notion that a 
population is limited by its food supply, together with the 
ideas that there will be competition for available food and 
that chance variation in progeny will give advantage to one 
type over another, gave Darwin his mechanism for organic 
evolution. But organic evolution is based on serial causal­
ity rather than closed chain, feedback-loop, antecedent- 
consequent event-linkage. Maithus had a conception of a
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system which would today be characterized as stable and
self-regulative. Darwin understood how this limitation
imposed by the system would alter the units of the system—  
the animal species. Darwin only barely misses the concept 
of ultrastability. Later, Pareto characterized society as a 
system in dynamic equilibrium, again self-regulative, and 
Dewey's interpretation of the reflex arc is clearly char- 
acterizable as a feedback mechanism. B. F. Skinner's con­
ception of operant conditioning is definitely systems 
oriented, as I will later show. But all these thinkers 
missed the great generality of their concept. True, they 
did conceive of themselves as borrowing a model from another 
person or field of endeavor, but it remained for Norbert
Wiener and Claud Shannon to clearly conceive the notion of
the general applicability of systems thinking; W. Ross Ashby 
developed this notion further. It is this feature of 
general systems theory that is exciting for me; that is, the 
fact that it is completely general.
I shall now attempt an answer to the questions posed 
at the beginning of this chapter. B. F. Skinner's book, 
Walden Twg,^ is essentially speculation about a general sys­
tems approach to social organization, although, of course, 
he does not so describe it. This book provides me with a 
specific example of systems thinking, the discussion of 
which will provide answers to my opening questions.
■(New York: Macmillan, 1962.)
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Walden Two is about a group of people who establish 
a colonial living arrangement. Behavioral engineers (the 
planners) attempt to shape the conditions of life within the 
colony so that maximum efficiency is achieved in coping with 
the chores of daily living— the routine maintenance func­
tions of eating, house cleaning, waste disposal, etc. The 
colonists devote an average of four hours per person each 
day to the business of keeping the colony going. The rest 
of their time the inmates have for their own use, within 
the bounds of colonial life.
The colonial situation itself imposes certain limi­
tations upon the freedom of the inmates, but this condition 
is probably no more limiting than that of our own culture.
The important point is: How are they, the people, recon­
ciled with the limitations that the mechanics of their 
social arrangements have imposed upon them?
In Walden Two the regulative machinery of the society 
is internalized. The people are in large measure conditioned 
to like what they must do. Responses such as jealousy and 
anger, which have neither survival value for the society nor 
for an individual within the society, are conditioned out. 
Better stated, conditions are manipulated so that these un­
desirable behavior patterns do not appear. The process is 
somewhat analogous to reducing friction in a machine. Ef­
ficiency is increased in two ways. In the first place, when 
an individual does the desirable thing from habit rather
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than from the employment of conscious judgments, the higher 
centers are left free for other activities. Secondly, and 
more important, in a society in which the values are in­
ternalized, the persons in positions of responsibility can 
be relied upon to act in the best interest of the com­
munity, without the inefficient use of double checks and 
watchdogs, and watchdog watchers to watch the watchdogs.
Another important feature of Walden Two is the ex­
perimental approach. No way of doing things is to be 
considered sacred. One can imagine that, under certain 
conditions, people might be able to resort to experiments 
about living arrangements. There is a limit in any experi­
mental situation as to what experiments may be tried. No 
experiment can be permitted that will totally disrupt the 
experimental situation, in this case the colony.
Walden Two is a colony organized for efficient 
living which, it is presumed, will implement, or at least 
make possible, the happiness of the inmates. Within the 
colonial structure, social experiments are encouraged, but 
the preservation of the colony’s integrity limits and takes 
precedence over any experimentation. This situation is not 
made explicit in Walden Two, but I can not see how it could 
be otherwise.
The foregoing is a thumbnail sketch of an isolated 
colony, but what is Skinner’s plan for man as a race? 
Skinner does not give us a complete blueprint, but the
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ultimate development that would follow a successful Walden 
Two would he the proliferation of other similar colonies.
No coercion or salesmanship would be needed; other forms of 
social organization would simply not be able to compete.
The mode of life of the race would change, and out of this 
complex of colonies, perhaps, a new social order would 
emerge. Skinner does not say anything about the emergence 
of any society beyond the colonies, but the possibilities 
are there, and these possibilities scare some of us. 
Speculation about the form of society that would come out of 
the whole race's adopting the way of life presented in 
Walden Two will be taken up again in the last part of this 
chapter.
When any type of social planning is discussed, two 
issues of a general and preliminary nature arise: (1) Can
man direct his own social development? (2) If man can 
direct his development, should he, unless he can ascertain 
the final outcome, envisage and approve the end result?
While the question, "Can man direct himself?" ap­
pears to present logical difficulties, few of us doubt, as 
a matter of fact, that man can be shaped, to some extent, 
by environmental factors within the control of others, and 
even, in some cases, of himself. The important thing here 
is to be sure that the desired results are indeed obtained 
and not some sloppy approximation of them. When behavioral 
engineering is undertaken by young, "book-learned"
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psychologists, the results are almost always some ludicrous 
caricature of the desired state of affairs. That man as an 
individual can, to some extent, direct his own development 
is beyond dispute when these terms are used in any ordinary 
sense; we can all think of instances from our own experience 
when we have directed ourselves. It is true that we can 
never foretell all the significant changes in our situation 
or character which will result from a given course of 
action; nevertheless, within broad limits, self-direction is 
possible. I am not here concerned about quibbles such as, 
"Are we the same after we have become something different?"
With those who admit that social planning is pos­
sible but who, nevertheless, maintain that we should not 
try to shape man through his social condition, I have 
little patience. In the first place, it seems to me that 
man is such that he will plan one way or the other. If we 
must plan, why not do it scientifically, with our eyes open 
all the way? Why leave the direction of society to the 
politicians and religious quacks who have so triumphantly 
guided the world into its present condition? Secondly, is 
there any virtue in chance events? If we want to accentuate 
randomness, then let us shape up people so that they will be 
less predictable. Whatever we do, it seems to me that we 
must do it quickly. By the year two thousand, if the 
present two to three per cent growth rate persists, there 
will be six billion people on the earth. I do not think any
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other arguments are needed; the situation is no longer 
critical, it is desperate.
I come now to the last and central question of this 
chapter; What would happen if Skinner's program, as outlined 
in Walden Two, were carried out? Mr. J. W. Krutch does not 
give a favorable prognosis. He believes that Skinner's 
program would lead to the disappearance of consciousness in 
man. Without consciousness, would there be any point to 
survival? A somewhat related objection to Skinner's program 
is that it would narrow the adaptive potential of the race 
and thus lead man into overspecialized rigidity, an evolu­
tionary blind alley. Are these objections valid? Would 
Skinner's program lead to these feared results? First, let 
me say that I believe Skinner and his critics agree about 
ultimate values, or ultimate ends I During a panel dis­
cussion of "Survival as the Ultimate Value" the following 
exchange took place between J. W. Krutch and B, F. Skinner:
Mr. Krutch: "Supposing you should come to the
conclusion, as a result of your investigations, 
that the healthiest and most enduring society was 
composed of creatures whose responses had become 
so automatically perfect that consciousness was 
no longer necessary and would disappear, would 
you consider this eternally surviving group of 
unconsciously functioning organisms a result you 
would envisage with equanimity and pleasure?
Mr. Skinner: "Yes, I would envisage that
result with pleasure; but what I would not is 
the condition in which that would be the case."
[I include the second clause of this reply for
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the sake of fairness though I do not think I under­
stand what it means.]3
For my own part, I wonder if these words "ultimate 
value" have much utility, but, be that as it may, Skinner's 
reply, garbled as it is, puts him in the same camp as 
Krutch, and almost everyone else. Skinner's second clause 
(which Krutch says he does not understand) means that he 
would not envisage with pleasure the condition in which 
survival could be obtained at the expense of consciousness. 
Skinner's second clause flatly contradicts the spirit of 
the first and reduces it to a quibble.
If anything meaningful can be said about ultimate 
values, it appears to me that most people, including Skinner, 
want man to survive as man. In other words, there are two 
inseparably linked "ultimate values": survival of the race
and survival of consciousness in at least some of the 
members.
Would the program of Walden Two produce "men?" 
devoid of consciousness? I am inclined to say, "No." In 
the first place, suppose that conditions were such that 
conscious awareness was not necessary for survival. This 
is no reason to suppose that consciousness would disappear. 
Only if consciousness were a hindrance to survival would we 
expect it to be lost. Secondly, I cannot see anything in 
the program of Walden Two that would lead to loss of
^Joseph Wood Krutch, "Men, Apes and Termites," 
Saturday Review. XLVI (Sept. 21, 1963), PP* 22-25-
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consciousness. Quite the contrary, there are indications 
that reflective ability would be at a premium. The whole 
atmosphere of the colony is experimental, including social 
experiments as well as others. If you are continually 
tampering with the social machinery, there will be a con­
tinual need for everyone in the society to adapt to slightly 
different conditions. But, "Are not the social adaptations 
carried out by conditioning techniques, with there being no 
need for conscious adaptations?" someone may ask. No 
society escapes interaction with its heritage. Suppose in 
our guilt-ridden society we decided to get rid of guilt by 
conditioning the young so that they would still grow up in 
association with people who did have the capacity for guilt 
feelings. Interaction between elders and youngsters would 
produce ramifying adjustments, a large number of which we 
would not be able to predict. Conditioning could not begin 
to handle the problem. Its utility as a tool of social ad­
justment is that it can be effectively used to remedy 
obvious social ills, not to settle everything in advance.
It is in looking beyond the immediate program of 
Walden Two as an isolated colony that most concern is 
aroused. Suppose that Walden Two is successful and other 
colonies of its type are established, that these colonies, 
being a more efficient form of social organization, grad­
ually incorporate the whole race within them. What kind of
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society, as a whole, will then emerge? Will it be, as 
Krutch fears, a termite-like society?
It is, then, the long-term effect of Walden Two that 
causes the most concern. Is this concern useful? Just how 
far into the future can we infer? A great, great grandchild 
of the founders of Walden Two would, in all probability, 
make decisions I could never predict among possibilities I 
cannot even imagine. What I am trying to say is that we can 
not wholly predict the outcome of any sequence of events we 
Initiate, within the culture as a whole. The very act of 
changing the culture will produce men different from us, 
men whose actions we may, in some measure, predict for a 
short time; but after that we can say little. Three kinds 
of indeterminacy prevent long-term predictions: (1) the
very mass and fuzziness of socially relevant data, (2) the 
fact that the planners cannot escape being a part of the 
plan, thus establishing unending feedback problems, and 
(3) the fact that tampering with social organization will 
ultimately put others in a social reference frame which we 
cannot even imagine.
Still it is possible to plan with a wide margin of 
error over the short span. Perhaps this can be clarified 
by analogy. Suppose I am an explorer in a strange country, 
and before me is a mountain range. I can make conjectures 
about what lies beyond and, upon the basis of this, make 
contingent plans, but is there any point in getting bogged
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down in long-term plans when contingency is piled upon 
contingency? Some possibility, the presence of which I can­
not even imagine while I stand in the valley, may present 
itself when I reach the crest of the ridge. As another 
example, suppose I am a poor young man embarking on a busi­
ness career. Suppose that I am determined to acquire wealth 
in order that my children may have social and educational 
advantages denied me. If I am a reflective person, un­
likely in this case, I will realize that I cannot hope to 
visualize the entire range of possibilities that will be 
opened to my children, in the event of my success.
Still, in both the above examples, we plan in order 
to expand our own and others' possibilities. The explorer 
or the young businessman, when they commit themselves to 
their respective courses of action, cannot know what the 
outcome will be.
If the earth is populated by Walden Two's, will 
man's possibilities be increased? Who can say? Skinner, 
of course, set up Walden Two with the idea of combating or 
removing certain obvious defects in our present culture. 
What, for example, is the point of living if all our time 
is taken up either in the chores of living, carried out in 
an exasperatingly inefficient way, or with going through 
some education mill performing pointless tasks in a per­
functory way so that we may, in part, escape the system?
If these obvious evils can be eliminated by a Walden Two, it
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then only remains to be decided whether the cure is worse 
than the disease. No one can say for sure; I do not know if 
it is even meaningful to talk about probabilities here. It 
seems to me that all we can do is to work to remove those 
evils we know, with full knowledge that these acts will 
create further problems for generations to come. What is 
wrong with that? Certainly we don’t want to take away all 
their problems. The inmates of the Walden Two's would have 
problems, problems in large part engendered by their very 
system of society.
Walden Two would not be an isolated system. The 
first colonies would exist in interaction with our present 
culture, which itself will continue to change. This condi­
tion of necessary adjustment to the larger culture, and the 
changes in it, will, in large measure, shape the institutions 
of the early Walden Two's. As the number of colonies in­
crease and finally predominate, they will then, changed in 
large measure by their interaction with the culture they are 
displacing, begin to interact with one another. Who knows 
what can happen in this kind of situation?
Still, the carrying out of a program such as Skinner
envisages would be enormously difficult. I do not think 
that the followers of Skinner have sufficient intelligence 
to make it work. If such a colony is ever tried, I suspect
that it will fail, and I do not expect any better results
from any other plan for racial improvement. Nevertheless,
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in spite of probable failure, I think some form of social 
planning should be tried. What do we have to lose? In a 
short time, our freedom of action will be narrowed to the 
vanishing point by population pressure. We are in a posi­
tion similar to that of a football team which is behind by 
three points with seconds left to play, the clock running, 
and no time outs left. But, cheer up, there may still be 
time for one more long pass.
CHAPTER V 
SYMPATHY AND INDIRECT COMMUNICATION
What is your aim in philosophy?— To shew the fly 
the way out of the fly-bottle.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
' Let us take stock: The basic notions of cybernetics
are sketched in Chapter One. In light of these basic no­
tions, introduced in Chapter One, two species of philosophical 
problems are discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter 
Four, additional philosophical problems which arise in con­
junction with social planning are considered. It is now 
time to introduce another problem: In just what sense can
we claim that systems theory offers an adequate explanation 
of phenomena? Three things need to be considered here:
(1) the nature of the model and how it is employed, (2) the 
nature of the kinds of justification we give for its em­
ployment, and (3) the nature of that which cannot be 
explained in terms of the model.
When any phenomenon is to be explained in system's 
theory, it is to be explained in terms of a determinate 
machine; and four things are involved in giving an adequate ^
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explanation In terms of a determinate machine. The first is 
linguistic: we must reach intersubjective agreement about
just what the elements of a situation are— a model of the 
situation must be agreed upon. The second is "substantive": 
we analyze elements of a situation into sub-elements— our 
focus changes so that what are elements in the larger system 
become systems. A third is "causal": we reach intersubjec-
tive agreement about how a given state shall determine a 
subsequent state in our determinate machine. The fourth is 
"purposive": we view our determinate machine as an element
in a larger machine and determine how it is that the pos­
sible states of the given machine govern the possible states 
of the larger machine. It may be instructive, here, to com­
pare these four aspects of systematic explanation with 
Aristotle's four usages of the word cause:
Now causes are talked of in four different ways: 
one cause is the being and essence of a thing, what 
it is for a thing to be what it is (for the reason why 
a thing is as it is is ultimately reducible to its 
definition, and the ultimate reason why a thing is as 
it is is a cause and first principle); a second is a 
things’s matter and substratum; a third is the source 
of its movement; and the fourth, the counterpart to 
the third, is the purpose of a thing and its good—  
for this is the goal of all generation and movement.‘
It seems, perhaps, that the only justification which 
can be given for employing general systems theory is prag­
matic. This, at least, I shall claim, but I shall argue for
Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. J. L. Creed, Book I, 
para. 3* From The Philosophy of Aristotle, trans. J. L. 
Creed, A. E. Wardman (New York, Toronto: The New American
Library; London: New English Library; 1963).
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a stronger justification. Part of the argument for this 
stronger justification will rest on what immediately follows 
— the explication of that which cannot be explained in terms 
of our finite-state model of man. As a preliminary, let me 
try to make clear the crucial relation between systems 
theory and analytical philosophy.
I have argued that many of the problems of philosophy 
simply disappear when we realize that our puzzlement is en­
gendered by usages of words. It is often the case that 
getting clear about word usage depends upon the development 
of some criteria for a given word’s usage. I do not mean 
to imply that our criteria shall settle all future problems 
about some word’s usage. No matter how rigorous our se­
mantic decision, it must be given in words. (The problem of 
definitions is raised again in the final chapter.) Never­
theless, for given instances a criterion sufficiently pre­
cise can be agreed on, and this is known to be the case.^
The principal value of the techniques of linguistic anal­
ysis is that they help us elucidate criteria. The elucida­
tion of criteria greatly facilitates dialogue, which in 
turn helps us to reach agreement.
From the standpoint of cybernetics, analytical 
philosophy is a technique for bringing various
^For a discussion of the point of view taken here, 
see Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1965)? in
particular, para. 164.
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data-processing machines into synchronization. This char­
acterization of analytical philosophy immediately brings to 
mind the notions of sympathy and indirect communication. I 
have said that I intend to develop a stronger justification 
for systems theory explanations than simple pragmatic con­
siderations. As the reader may already have guessed, this 
"stronger" justification will be metaphysical. I shall at­
tempt to establish the foundation for this metaphysical 
appeal by discussing sympathy and indirect communication.
In this endeavor, I shall depart somewhat from my heretofore 
ahistorical treatment.
The scene opens in the eighteenth century. David 
Hume, Adam Smith, Hartley, and, indeed, most of the Scottish 
school of philosophy, feeling the need for a foundation for 
ethics, revived a notion that has roots at least as far back 
as Democritus, Plato, and, probably, Pythagoras.3 They in­
sinuated into modern thought the concept of sympathy, or 
empathy.
For Hume, the faculty of imagination bridged the gap 
between man and man, and he clearly formulated the notion of 
reciprocal feedback in interpersonal relations :
The bare opinion of another, especially when 
inforc’d with passion, will cause an idea of good or 
evil to have an influence upon us, which wou'd 
otherwise have been entirely neglected. This proceeds 
from the principle of sympathy or communication; and
3wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy.
Vol. I (New York, Evanston: Harper and Row, PP* 109-
32.
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sympathy, as I have already observ'd, is nothing but 
the conversion of an idea into an impression by the 
force of imagination.^
In general we may remark, that the minds of men are
mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each
other's emotions,
but also because those rays of passions, sentiments 
and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay 
away by insensible degrees. Thus the pleasure, which 
a rich man receives from his possessions, being 
thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and 
esteem; which sentiments again, being perceiv'd and 
sympathiz'd with, encrease the pleasure of the 
possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new 
foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder.5
Adam Smith felt that we could imaginatively project 
ourselves into another's situation, and in some measure feel 
what he feels:
As we have no immediate experience of what other 
men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which 
they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in the like situation. . . .  By the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we 
enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him. . .
The arguments for sympathy are from analogy and 
appeal to plausibility: (l) It appears that we do, to some
degree, communicate our emotions. (2) Physically and
^David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. T. H. 
Green, T. H. Grose, Vol. II (London, New York: Longmans,
Green, 1898), p. 205*
5lbid.. p. 152.
^Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 11th ed., 
Vol. I (Edinburgh: Printed for Bell and Bradfute, 1808),
pp. 2-3.
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behaviorally, people are much alike. (3) It can be observed 
that if two similarly tuned stringed instruments are in close 
proximity and one is played upon, the strings of the other 
will vibrate in unison (sympathy) with the strings of the 
played instrument. There is some likelihood that a similar 
sympathy exists between men. In the absence of other 
equally plausible theories which would account for the ap­
parent communication among people, the doctrine of sympathy 
had great appeal for nineteenth-century thinkers.
At the time Kierkegaard came to intellectual ma­
turity, the notion of sympathy was much in the air. Liter­
ary figures in England and Germany made much use of it, 
among them Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Goethe. The 
utility of sympathy lay in its accounting for, or providing 
an explanation of, communication. The emphasis was not at 
first upon establishing contact with the world, or with 
establishing truth. It was much more a tool of communica­
tion than a key to metaphysics.
Indirect communication is a way of breaking down the 
barriers between men, and it can succeed only if it estab­
lishes sympathy. The Romantics were well aware of these 
circumstances, but they did not grasp all of the diffi­
culties involved in indirect communication. In Rene Wellek's 
discussion of Romanticism, he concludes that the Romanti­
cists "all see the implication of imagination, symbol, myth 
and organic nature, and see it as part of the great
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endeavor to overcome the split between subject and object, 
the self and the world, the conscious and the unconscious. 
Sympathy was a means of breaking down the barriers between 
men, but the Romantics, especially Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
extended the concept of sympathy to include animals and 
nature.
Wordsworth was interested in the sympathy which can 
be established between men, but he was more interested in 
the general sympathy between man and nature. Nature, for 
Wordsworth, became a shaping force in the development of 
the adult. "Ode. Intimations of Immortality From Recol­
lections of Early Childhood,” "The Prelude," and ''The White 
Doe of Rylstone” reveal Wordsworth's ideas on the shaping 
powers of nature through sympathy.
Although the word sympathy is used only once in 
"Ode. Intimations of Immortality From Recollections of 
Early Childhood," written in 1803, I think that the concept 
of sympathy, and especially imaginative sympathy, is basic 
to the poem. Wordsworth speaks of "primal sympathy," which 
is used to emphasize the link between what the adult has 
and what he had as a child. This can be felt partially 
through memory, but primarily through sympathy. The poet 
can imagine what the child feels, and he can receive im­
pulses from nature through sympathy.
^Ren/ Wellek, "Romanticism Re-examined," Romanticism 
Reconsidered, ed. Northrop Frye (New York, London: Columbia
University Press, 19640, p. 132.
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In "The Prelude," Wordsworth uses the French Aris­
tocracy as an example of what happens when men disregard 
their common humanity:
A light, a cruel, and vain world cut off 
From the natural inlets of just sentiment, o
From lowly sympathy and chastening truth . . .
Wordsworth turns to the heavenly and feels we can transcend
through sympathy with nature and natural objects to the
spiritual:
— the consciousness 
Of whom they are, habitually infused 
Through every image and through every thought.
And all affections by communion raised _
From earth to heaven, from human to divine; . . .?
Further, Wordsworth describes the theme of "The White Doe of 
Rylstone":
Where anguish, strange as dreams of rest­
less sleep.
Is tempered and allayed by sympathies 
Aloft ascending, and descending deep.
Even to the inferior Kinds; . . .'^
Coleridge was more interested in the psychology which
made possible indirect communication through sympathy between
man and man or man and nature. Colleridge was interested in
the means by which the sympathetic imagination could develop
and come to realize meanings which could not be conveyed by
^Poetical Works of Wordsworth, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, 
rev. Ernest de Selincourt (London, New York, Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 196I), Book IX, 11. 3^9-51j P» 559*
9lbid.. Book XIV, 11. 11^-18, ppi-$8^-85.
lOlbid.. 11. p. 312.
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words alone. Coleridge's poem "To William Wordsworth" is 
probably the best description of this indirect communica­
tion. In the following lines, Coleridge states that, due 
to the imagination, the poet, Wordsworth, has conveyed more 
than words alone can communicate:
. . . thou hast dared to tell 
What may be told, to the understanding mind 
Revealable; and what within the mind 
By vital breathings secret as the soul 
Of vernal growth, oft quickens in the heart 
Thoughts all too deep for wordsÎ— 11
Although they probably could not have influenced each 
other, Hawthorne's notions of sympathy and indirect communi­
cation were close to those of Kierkegaard. Evidence of this 
can be seen in Hawthorne's short stories (e.g. "Ethan 
Brand") and The Scarlet Letter.^^
Kierkegaard did not need metaphysics, but he did 
want to communicate. He felt himself in possession of the 
truth, but of a truth the very nature of which almost
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "To William Wordsworth," 
The Poems of Samuel Tavlor Coleridge. ed. Ernest Hartley 
Coleridge Tlondon: Oxford University Press, I960), 11.
6—11, p . ^-0^.
further discussion on Hawthorne's use of sympathy 
can be found in Roy R. Male's essay "Hawthorne and the Con­
cept of Sympathy," PMLA. LXVIII (March, 1953), PP- 138-49.
The interrelated notions of indirect communication, point 
of view, sympathy, and the absurd receive extensive treat­
ment in the works of Hawthorne's friend, Herman Melville. 
These notions are related in the following way: Shifts
in perspective occasioned by successful indirect communica­
tion produce in one the feeling that the world is absurd, 
grotesque. Melville's "Bartleby," "Benito Cereno," and 
passages in the "Encantadas" should be consulted here.
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precluded its communication. I believe that Kierkegaard’s 
fantastic insight into the nature and the difficulties of 
communication came about because he was not involved in dis­
covering objective truth, but focused almost his entire 
energy upon the problem of communication.
It is his technique and not his truth that I find 
interesting. In many ways he went far beyond his prede­
cessors, contemporaries, and most, if not all, of his 
successors in his awareness of the problems of communica­
tion.
The doctrine of sympathy, while it no doubt served 
as the ground out of which many of Kierkegaard’s ideas 
grew, was much like a musical theme on which he expands and 
varies. There are at least six somewhat overlapping aspects 
in which Kierkegaard can be seen as reinterpreting and ex­
panding the doctrine of sympathy: (1) With Kierkegaard, the
emphasis is more on the sender than on the receiver. He is 
more concerned with bringing another to see the world as he 
(Kierkegaard) sees it than with merely apprehending another’s 
point of view. Not that he neglects this aspect; it is 
indeed necessary to understand another reference frame if 
we are intelligently to alter it. Kierkegaard can already, 
in this aspect of the problem, be seen as having a sounder 
grasp than his predecessors. He views both sides of the 
issue and is actually trying to direct another, rather than 
merely passively understand him; he strives to understand
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primarily to influence. (2) He is interested in bringing 
another literally into the same emotional state or refer­
ential standpoint as himself rather than merely inducing him 
to imagine himself in this condition. The imaginative at­
tempt is encouraged in the reader primarily for the effect 
it will have on the emotional state. Kierkegaard is 
amazingly sensitive to moods and how they condition our 
thought. (3) Kierkegaard brings up the point that the mode 
of communication should reflect that which is communicated. 
To sympathy, he adds harmony or congruence.
Something wonderful has happened to me. I was 
caught up into the seventh heaven. There sat all 
the gods in assembly. By special grace I was granted 
the privilege of making a wish. "Wilt thou," said 
Mercury, "have youth or beauty or power or a long life 
or the most beautiful maiden or any of the other 
glories we have in the chest? Choose, but only one 
thing." For a moment I was at à loss. Then I ad­
dressed myself to the gods as follows: "Most honor­
able contemporaries, I choose this one thing, that I 
may always have the laugh on my side." Not one of the 
gods said a word; on the contrary, they all began to 
laugh. From that I concluded that my wish was 
granted, and found that the gods knew how to express 
themselves with taste; for it would hardly have been 
suitable for them to have answered gravely: "Thy
wish is granted."13
(k) There is no sharp differentiation between mood and
thought, or idea and emotion. They run together in a smooth
ongoing sequence. The sender uses words to create a mood.
^s^ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or. trans. David F . 
Swenson, Lillian Marvin Swenson, rev. Howard A. Johnson,
Vol. I (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959)? PP* ^1-^2.
More of the same can be found in pp. 68, 69, 70 of Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson, Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^1)*
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In the nexus of this mood, thoughts can evoke emotions, the 
thoughts being evoked by words. (5) The sender is, when in 
direct conversation with someone else, ever sensitive to 
feedback. This reflective character of interpersonal rela­
tions is well described in ray first quotation from Hume, 
but Kierkegaard shows this process in action; he gives us a 
demonstration in the "Diary of the Seducer." (6) Since 
Kierkegaard’s orientation is active rather than passive, it 
lends itself to an experimental approach in interpersonal 
relations. These experiments will not only help the sender 
make decisions about the case at hand, but will also train 
him in manipulative technique. Kierkegaard, of course, 
could neither experiment nor make use of feedback in his 
writings, and I can well understand his scepticism about 
being able to lead others into the way of the truth.
The doctrine of sympathy, as well as Kierkegaard’s 
indirect communication, assumes that people are very much 
alike in basic structure. This raises a small problem. If 
people are so much alike, why can’t they communicate 
directly? Why don't words always mean the same thing to 
everyone speaking the same language ("same" is used in two 
different senses here)? I think a case could be made here 
for the position that people are very similar in structure, 
but are made different by environment. Our problem here is 
to provide a corrective for the environment so that others 
will see things as we do.
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Kierkegaard distinguishes between an essential and
an accidental secret. An accidental secret is instantly
understood when it is revealed. On the other hand,
when Socrates isolated himself from every external re­
lationship by making an appeal to his daemon, and 
assumed, as I suppose, that everyone must do the same, 
such a view of life is essentially a secret, or 
constitutes an essential secret, because it cannot be 
communicated directly. The most that Socrates could 
do was to help another negatively, by a maieutic 
artistry, to achieve the same view. Everything sub­
jective, which through its dialectical inwardness 
eludes a, direct form of expression, is an essential 
secret.^ ^
This, then, is Kierkegaard's problem in the 
Postscript; he is in possession of the truth, and this 
truth is essentially a secret. The essential truth is sub­
jective, contained in a view of life, and at times equated 
with a view of life. The teacher or sender can, at best, 
only bring others to the same view, a difficult and always 
uncertain task. In the final analysis, the teacher can only 
hope that he has succeeded; he can never be sure.
In Either/Or ("Diary of the Seducer") the problem 
confronting the seducer is similar to, but somewhat differ­
ent from, that confronting the writer of the Postscript.
In this case the seducer is again certain of what it is that 
he wants to accomplish, but the reason for his action is 
felt to be an arbitrary choice of the aesthetic in preference 
to the ethical. The seducer is totally and passionately in­
volved in his task. The passion is largely generated by the
^^Kierkegaard, Postscript, p.
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obstacles in the way of its satisfaction, by a barrier. The 
seducer sets himself the task of bringing a girl into the 
frame of mind necessary to his enjoyment of her. The task 
of the seducer is different from that of the teacher, but 
the method of its accomplishment is essentially the same.
The chief methodological difference is that the seducer has 
the advantage of feedback from the girl.
The human situation, as Kierkegaard saw it, is es­
sentially one of isolation. There can be no certainty of 
contact between men even in the most commonplace conversation. 
Truth equals subjective certainty, and Kierkegaard is sub­
jectively certain of himself and God and nothing else. I do 
not know that he actively doubted the existence of the 
physical world and other men, but I believe he would have 
said that he could not be absolutely certain of such things.
In a way, Hegel sought what Kierkegaard sought: 
absolute certainty. Hegel's attempt was to create a system 
and a method, the design of which would enable one to fit 
any possible development into the system. Hegel could not 
know what his system would look like in years to come, but 
he felt that his method would incorporate anything into his 
system. Kierkegaard was not happy because the final para­
graph had not yet been written, in fact, seeing the finitude 
of man, could never be written.
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We shall have to abstract from the fact that 
knowledge of the world-historical is. as a cog­
nitive act, an approximation. subject to the dialectic 
involved in every conflict between the ideal and the 
empirical, a dialectic which threatens every moment 
to prevent â beginning, and after a beginning 
has been made threatens every moment a revolt against 
this beginning. The historical material is infinite, 
and the imposition of a limit must therefore in 
one way or another be arbitrary. Although the 
historical material belongs to the past, it is as 
subjective for cognition not complete; it is constantly 
coming into being through new observations and in­
quiries, new discoveries are constantly brought to 
light, compelling not only additions but also re­
visions. Just as improvements in the instruments of 
observation facilitate new discoveries in the natural 
sciences, so every improvement in the methods of 
critical inquiry will in the same manner affect the 
world-historical material.^5
A somewhat analogous attitude could be taken toward 
the study of infinite series, A rule can be given for 
generating a series, but the series is such that it is al­
ways possible to write one more term. If the series is 
limited, it is an arbitrarily imposed limit. The series of 
natural numbers is a good example of this situation. A man 
like Hegel would here be satisfied with the rule; one like 
Kierkegaard would not— he would object that the series was 
not yet complete, that any proposed completion would be an 
arbitrary imposition. Moreover, truth is inwardness ac­
cording to Kierkegaard, and how can the world-historical be 
internalized? I do not intend to imply that Kierkegaard 
would reject the enterprise of "discovering" rules for
l^ibid,. p. 13^.
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generating infinite series. I only mean that he would be 
quite sceptical about what the rule tells us.
We might wonder why Kierkegaard, looking out from 
this condition of isolation from other men, from society, 
from nature, and indeed, from everything except God, bothered 
to write at all. One can say that he wrote only in order 
that he might thus work out and clarify his thought for 
himself, but the very manner in which he wrote would argue 
against this hypothesis. Typically, he thought out a book 
and then wrote it. In other words, his ideas were clear be­
fore he began to write.
It seems plausible to me that while Kierkegaard 
could not be certain that he could communicate with others, 
he was also not certain that he could not. He did feel 
that he could not know that he had communicated, but this 
does not rule out the possibility of communication. Of one 
thing we can be reasonably certain: Kierkegaard did not
believe that one man could possibly communicate the truth 
to another I The truth is essentially subjective; by its 
very nature, it can not be communicated. This does not 
rule out the possibility that one man may lead another into 
the way of the truth; but, emphatically, even this is a 
problematic situation.
It is important to be clear about the communicative 
situation, what can be communicated, and the nature of
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truth. Kierkegaard himself would caution us not to be 
hasty; we might overlook something important.
If I say to someone, "The pot is on the table," I 
have neither given him the truth nor put him in the way of 
the truth. As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, I have at­
tempted to communicate in a problematic way with a problem­
atic entity concerning problematic objects in problematic 
relations. The truth is, for whomever I am talking to, 
subjective. How can such things as tables and pots be 
subjective? The person cannot even be one hundred percent 
sure of his own sense perceptions; and, for Kierkegaard, 
anything less than certainty is not equal to truth. The 
situation is thus : we can possibly communicate with others
about problematic external objects and events, but truth is 
of necessity ruled out of this situation.
We can, possibly, communicate to others words which 
may, possibly, lead them into a state of mind where they 
may, possibly, experience the truth— passionate certainty. 
This leading of another into the way of truth is, if pos­
sible, of necessity an indirect communication.
What has been said of Kierkegaard, his philosophy, 
the historical setting for that philosophy, and 
Kierkegaard’s relations to other thinkers was said with the 
intention of explicating what Kierkegaard meant by, and how 
he made use of, indirect communication. The foregoing also 
sets the stage for an examination of the question: What is
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there of value in the concept of indirect communication for 
us?
If, as some modern philosophers have done, we think 
of words as serving in semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic 
capacities, we could say that Kierkegaard used words es­
sentially in their pragmatic function. Just as the animal 
trainer uses the various stimuli at his disposal to put an 
animal into a situation where it will evoke a desired re­
sponse, so Kierkegaard uses words to shape the mood of his 
listeners, to put them in that condition where they may re­
ceive the truth.
Just as the animal trainer may need to establish 
preliminary conditions such as blocking exits from the train» 
ing cage, arena, so Kierkegaard is concerned to discredit 
any proposed alternative to becoming subjective.
Kierkegaard's focusing upon the situation and the 
use of words within a situation, together with his tacit 
emphasis on the pragmatic use of words, has, in my opinion, 
significantly influenced important modern thinkers, among 
them Heidegger and Wittgenstein.
Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, tries to bring us into 
a situation where, it is hoped, we will experience some kind 
of truth. Heidegger believes that if we ask the question, 
"Why are there essents rather than nothing?" this question 
can be made to recoil upon the asker in such a way that 
the ground of the question will be experienced.
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But jS this question is asked and if the act of 
questioning is really carried out, the content and the 
object of the question react inevitably on the act of 
questioning. . . . Here it may suffice to say that 
the leap in this questioning opens up its own source—  
with this leap the question arrives at its own ground.
We call such a leap, which opens up its own source, 
the original source or origin (Ur-sprung), the finding 
of one's own ground. It is because the question, "Why 
are there essents rather than nothing?" breaks open 
the ground for all authentic questions and is thus at 
the origin (Ursprung) of them all that we must recog­
nize it as the most fundamental of all questions.1°
Kierkegaard’s influence upon Wittgenstein was im­
portant even though Wittgenstein refused to accept his con­
cept of private meaning.^7 Wittgenstein shows his kinship 
to Kierkegaard in his extreme pessimism about being able to 
communicate. In the Preface to the Tractatus. Wittgenstein 
says, "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone 
who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed 
in it— or at least similar thoughts."1^ Later, in the Inves­
tigations . he repeats his pessimism: "It is not impossible
that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty 
and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one 
brain or another— but, of course, it is not likely."^9
^^Martin Heidegger, ^  Introduction to Metaphysics, 
trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1961), p. 74.
I^See paragraph 293, Section I, of Wittgenstein's 
Investigations for his attack on private meaning.
^^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus., 
trans. D. F. Pears, B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press, 1963), p. 3.
19Wittgenstein, Investigations, p. X®.
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When again Wittgenstein comes to say that words de­
rive their meaning from (1) their use, and (2) their context, 
we are led to think of Kierkegaard and his use of words to 
lead one into the condition (context) where he may receive 
the truth. For Wittgenstein, the meanings of concepts are 
almost inextricably tied up with the meanings of related 
concepts. If we start to explain the meaning of some con­
cept, say a philosophical one, we find ourselves explaining 
the meaning in terms of other philosophical concepts.
I mention Heidegger and Wittgenstein merely to call 
attention to the fact that the kind of uncertainty so inti­
mately felt and so arduously avoided by Kierkegaard is still 
very much with us. Indeed, since the time Descartes formu­
lated what Whitehead called the "subjectivist principle" and 
made "clear and distinct conception" the mark of truth, 
scepticism about the knowing process, which, from the stand­
point of cybernetics, is the other side of the communication 
process, has haunted modern philosophy.
If one makes the starting point of philosophy that 
which is clearly and distinctly present to a subject, I do 
not see how Hume’s sceptical conclusions and the uncertainty 
engendered by those conclusions can be avoided. After all, 
that which is clear and distinct is just that— clear and 
distinct— and there is no necessary connection between 
things distinctly conceived on the same level of analysis.
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One can, with the later Wittgenstein, settle for 
clarity and not attempt to achieve complete distinctness, or 
one can attempt to construct a model which àllows for dis­
tinctness at a given level, to any desired degree, without 
imagining that complete distinctness is possible, or even 
that the notion of complete distinctness makes sense.
Hume believed that one distinct conception in no 
way entailed another distinct conception; but are the 
distinct conceptions of one man identical with those of 
another? (A part of the meaning of the word "intelligence” 
is the degree to which a given individual can isolate and 
distinguish.)
For some people, the concept of Christian actually 
entails the concept of belief in a literal interpretation 
of the Bible. By this I mean that if some individual does 
not believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible then it 
is impossible for these people to conceive of him as a 
Christian. I am well aware that what I am saying here 
implies a linking of logic with psychology. One can also 
use the word logic in connection with an agreed-upon set of 
rules applied to terms where various relations of entailment 
are agreed to hold.
Two levels of "agreement" need to be distinguished 
here. First, we have definitions which are arrived at 
through dialogue. Second, there is a presumption that 
agreement must have already been reached with respect to
9^
certain basic terms; otherwise, we would not be able to make 
a beginning at all. At the first level, we are directly 
aware of agreement; at the second, agreement is a necessary 
hypothesis.
Plato, in the Meno, advises us to proceed upon 
hypothesis when no teacher is available, and cybernetics 
allows us to elaborate a model of man in which we can ex­
plain our certainty about being uncertain. (I have already 
dealt with certainty in Chapter Three.) I have, I think, 
made adequate preparation for the following statement: It
is simply a fact of human experience that what we know is 
distinct; this is a fundamental, i n e x p l i c a b l e ^ ^  fact. It 
is also a fundamental fact that we can blur distinctions 
and, for example, see cows, hogs, and chickens as sources 
of protein. Cybernetics allows us to reconcile these two 
fundamental facts. Everything depends on the level of 
coding, or homomorphic reduction.
It is necessary that I interrupt the main thread of 
my essay here to assert that I am aware of a difficulty 
which arises in conjunction with an explanation of the 
given. Descartes would have us analyze that which is per­
ceptually given into that which is conceptually simple or
^®By this, I mean that the explanation will be less 
certain than the fact.
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s e l f - e v i d e n t . But no conceptual analysis of the table on 
which I am writing into a collection of points and lines and 
relations between points and lines has the immediacy of the 
table as I experience it. Hume, in order to explain how it 
is that we have a conception of s p a c e , 22 would analyze the 
table into a collection of points, but I do not experience a 
collection of points.
The difficulty with both Descartes and Hume is that 
their "bloodless dissection," carried out for the purpose of 
giving an explanation of the perceptually given, does not 
square with the immediacy of the perceived given.
Yet, in so far as the table can be known, we must 
know it as a line of behavior. Speaking almost in metaphor, 
we say that experiencing the table is a process whereby 
the subjective becomes objectified, a process whereby what 
is datum for thought or feeling is, through the process of 
homomorphic reduction, rendered as thought or feeling.
If, for purposes of explanation and in accordance 
with our feeling, we maintain that the data of thought or 
feeling arise from an external world (we are now hopelessly 
trapped in metaphysics), we will probably say that my mon­
itoring of the table, at least the feeling component, is a
P1 See Descartes’ "Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind I, " Descartes Selections, ed. Ralph M. Eaton (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955)» in particular, p. 80.
22cavid Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume Se­
lections . ed. Charles W. Hendel, Jr. (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1955)? P* 16.
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process whereby the objective is rendered subjective. The 
whole activity, from beginning to end, may be characterized 
as the process whereby the objective world is "objectified" 
in thought.
A metaphysical defense of the general theory of 
systems thus rests upon a claim: Thought is about discrete
objects; our language, if nothing else, guarantees this.
Any explanation of a reality below the level of thought must, 
when talked about, acquire, if it does not "naturally" 
possess, a discrete character. ("I gotta use words when I 
talk to you.") So, when I say atomic actuality governs 
perception, I simply mean that any description, or discus­
sion, of any hypothetical mechanism of perception will 
impart, because of our language and the very nature of in­
formation transfer, the notion of atomicity.
Furthermore, at the level of direct awareness, it 
is, I maintain, impossible even to imagine an ordering 
process which does not imply discreteness. In fact, the 
notion of ordering the non-discrete is very close to, if 
not actually, being analytically impossible (or self- 
stultifying) .
It is also a fact that we approach our fellow men, 
and indeed, anything else, as though he were a determinate 
machine, as though one state of the system entailed another 
state of the system. In every case, we "abstractC?)" a 
determinate model. It is my contention that this assertion
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needs no proof. All anyone need do to be convinced is con­
sult his own experience. These principles, that of "atomic 
actuality," which governs perception, and "conceptual en­
tailment," which governs explanation, are inescapable if one 
wants to indulge in metaphysics. Why, then, not be honest 
with ourselves and accept the metaphysical implications of 
these principles?
The model which we perforce use, or, at any rate, the 
model we must appeal to when we give explanations, that of 
the discrete-state, finite, determined machine, simply does 
not allow the possibility of there being an answer to many 
of the problems of philosophy.^3 It is impossible, in prin­
ciple, to give an adequate answer to the question: "What
is the nature of the whole universe?" For our ability to 
say anything at all necessitates that we choose among pos­
sibilities; and if we said what the universe is like, that 
answer would have to include all possibilities. It is im­
possible, in principle, to give an explanation of our atomic 
apprehension of the world. Anything in terms of which an 
explanation could be given of that which is presented in 
experience as discrete, would itself of necessity have been 
given as discrete; this demand is built into our model. 
Finally, it is impossible for a machine to monitor
^This statement must not be taken as implying that 
the notion of continuity is excluded from explanation. A 
little reflection will convince anyone that both discrete­
ness and continuity are involved in explanations.
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completely, or take complete account of, itself— this point 
was developed earlier.
I have gone to some lengths to develop the notion of 
indirect communication because it is both essential for an 
explanation of human affairs and, I think, tacitly taken for 
granted in our day-to-day actions. The final chapter con­
tinues the discussion of communication.
CHAPTER VI
A FOCUS IMAGINARIUS; THE LIBERALLY 
EDUCATED MAN
[Transcendental Ideas or dialectical concepts] . . . 
have an excellent, and indeed indispensably neces­
sary, regulative employment, namely, that of 
directing the understanding towards a certain goal 
upon which the routes marked out by all its rules 
converge, as upon their point of intersection.
This point is indeed a mere idea, a focus 
imaginarius. from which . . . the concepts of the 
understanding do not in reality proceed; none the 
less it serves to give these concepts the greatest 
(possible) unity combined with the greatest (possible) 
extension.
Immanuel Kant
Although Shannon’s work in information theory is one 
of the most vital facets of the general theory of systems, 
that work of itself does not solve the linguistic problems 
surrounding the act of communication. On the other hand, 
prior to Shannon’s work, every attempt to deal with the 
problem of interpersonal communication ultimately involved 
one in some kind of paradox due to some seemingly unavoid­
able category mistake made at some point in the investiga­
tion. Furthermore, until the advent of cybernetics, it was 
impossible to formulate in terms of a model two obvious and
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important aspects of communication: communication on the
nonverbal level and indirect communication. I hope now to 
show how it is that our present frame of reference, char­
acterized by categorical habits of thought, can be shown to 
be inadequate, and through this showing to make you see a 
way out of the bottle. In order to effect this indirect 
communication, I will present directly my image of the ideal 
man, the liberally educated man, and discuss some of the 
problems attending his development. It will perhaps help to 
think of this effort as an attempt to doubly define the 
liberally educated man.
It is impossible to define satisfactorily the 
liberally educated man from a categorical perspective. That 
is, as long as one thinks of words as names of classes and 
names of relations between classes, he will not see the 
world in such a way as to be able to generate any definition 
he can remain happy with. This is so whether the attempt is 
lexical, genetic, behavioral, or even, as I will show later, 
ostensive.
Nevertheless, it is useful to make attempts at def­
inition. Such attempts can lead us to a more adequate con­
ception of language; we say what we can and so find out what 
cannot be said.^ It is particularly useful to attempt a 
definition of the liberally educated man because the attempt
"'This notion can be found in Kierkegaard, 
Wittgenstein, and Dewey.
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to define this kind of man from a categorical perspective 
may lead one into just that perspective, or frame of refer­
ence, where and from which a useful definition can be of­
fered and understood.
The use of statements formed in, and from, the 
categorical perspective may lead one to see that these
statements are, from an entirely different point of view,
nonsense. In order to understand the term "liberally edu­
cated man," you must become just that, and that is why the 
definition of the liberally educated man should be attempted. 
This is not to say that everyone who attempts to define this
term will be led to see the world in a different way; but it
will tend to be so, and perhaps in a few the transformation 
will be complete.
Many attempts at defining the liberally educated man 
have been made from the categorical perspective. I shall 
not dwell upon them but instead will characterize them as 
one of the following types;
I. Lexical attempts: Here one says, "Look at the 
meaning of each significant term in the phrase" (the article 
is here unimportant, since "the" could be "a" without alter­
ing our problem). Mow, you put together the meanings of 
"liberal," "educated," and "man," and there you have it— the 
definition of "liberally educated man."
II. Genetic attempts: Here one attempts to under­
stand the meaning of the phrase by examining environmental
102
aspects which might produce one of these creatures we call a 
liberally educated man. Here we might say, "I may be unable 
to tell you what a liberally educated man is, but I can tell 
you how to produce one.”
III. Behavioral attempts: Here we tell some of the
things a liberally educated man does and does not do. There 
are two aspects to this approach. One can talk in general 
terms: The liberally educated man is honest, trustworthy,
reverent, etc. Alternatively, one can try to specify the 
liberally educated man’s behavior in unique situations. The 
more detail that is given, the more this latter approach re­
sembles our next attempt.
IV. Ostensive or quasi-ostensive attempts: Here 
one takes specific examples of liberally educated men—  
either historical or fictional figures— and says, "By 
liberally educated man I mean someone like Gandhi, Buddha, 
Jesus, etc."
The lexical attempt leads one to play the most pe­
culiar of language games— the one in which one tries to find 
criteria for good definitions. At back of this activity 
there has often been the notion that words have, or ought to 
have, essential, exact, or precisely limited meanings. In 
addition, it is often felt that one ought to be able to 
specify in advance all possible meanings and the exact
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limits of these meanings before he is entitled to use a word^ 
(before you can say you are doing a pious act, you must 
specify what piety is).
But let us ask some simple questions. How is it that 
you already use words when you begin to play the language 
games of "definitions” and "giving rules for definitions?" 
And, what about those words you use to give your definitions 
--have you already defined them; do they have any exact 
boundary?
Perhaps you would like to say, "Our definitions are 
not complete." That is, if someone asks, "What do you mean 
by the term 'Oswald'?" you feel that you can respond with 
some list of definite descriptions.3 That is, you say, "By 
Oswald, I mean the man who shot Kennedy, and the man who 
purchased such and such rifle from such and such mail order 
house, and the man who was shot by Jack Ruby." But now you 
go on to say, "Of course, I cannot exhaust the subject 
'Oswald' by any list of definite descriptions," and here it 
looks as if our attempt to define has been somehow defeated 
by the complexity, the richness, of the subject.
At this point, one might say, "Yes, it is all very 
true that no list of descriptions will exhaustively define
^See Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Nominaturn," Mean­
ing and Knowledge, ed. Ernest Nagel, Richard B. Brandt 
(New York, Chicago, Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1965), p. 77.
^See Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions in 
"On Denoting," Meaning and Knowledge, pp. 78-87.
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an object of sense experience." But even though something 
is always left out, the mesh of our conceptual net may be 
made as fine as we wish, and we can, so to speak, "know" the 
meaning of a sign to whatever degree of accuracy one may 
specify.^ Alternatively, one might say, "All I mean by the 
term ’Oswald' is just the object of which this enumerated 
list of descriptions is true."
But what if in the above account of what I mean by 
"Oswald" it should turn out that one of the descriptions 
should be false? Suppose, for instance, it should be dis­
covered that Oswald did not shoot the President. Am I now 
going to say I did not know what I was talking about when I 
used the term "Oswald"? But then, if I don’t know, accord­
ing to the picture developed here, how can I mean? And 
saying I intended such and such only obscures the issue, for 
how do I know what I intend?
It is easy to see that both the genetic and the 
general behavioral approach to defining the liberally edu­
cated man are subject to the same kind of criticism as the 
lexical, for the terms used in these definitions require 
definition if one is to feel absolutely certain that he knows 
what he is talking about.
The above consideration leads us to examine the 
ostensive definition. Faith in the ultimate veridical
^See Friedrich Waismann on the open texture of em­
pirical concepts in "Verifiability," Meaning and Knowledge, 
pp. 38-k-6.
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character of ostensive definitions rests upon the belief 
that knowledge grows out of experience with particular 
instances. The final appeal here is to the particular case. 
William James makes this point well:
If we should inquire for the essence of "govern­
ment ," for example, one man might tell us it was 
authority, another submission, another police, another 
an army, another an assembly, another a system of 
laws; yet all the while it would be true that no con­
crete government can exist without all these things, 
one of which is more important at one moment and 
others at another. The man who knows governments most 
completely is he who troubles himself least about a 
definition which shall give their essence. Enjoying 
an intimate acquaintance with all their particularities 
in turn, he would naturally regard an abstract con­
ception in which these were unified as a thing more 
misleading than enlightening.5
But James' position, while undoubtedly having a strong in­
tuitive appeal, is open to a grave criticism: it is always
possible to misinterpret an ostensive definition. This can 
be easily seen in the following passage from Alice's Adven­
tures in Wonderland. During the cross-examination of the Mad 
Hatter, the following scene occurs:
Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered, and was im­
mediately suppressed by the officers of the court.
(As that is rather a hard word, I will just explain 
to you how it was done. They had a large canvas bag, 
which tied up at the mouth with strings : into this
they slipped the guinea-pig, head first, and then sat 
upon it.)
"I'm glad I've seen that done," thought Alice.
"I've so often read in the newspapers, at the end of 
trials, 'There was some attempt at applause, which
^William James, The Varieties of Religious Ex­
perience (New York: Modern Library, 1902), pp. 2?-^.
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was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court,' 
and I never understood what it meant till now.”6
Now Alice knows the meaning of the term "suppress," and one
can imagine her envisioning an "attempt at applause" or the
people making the attempt being stuffed in a sack and sat
upon. But, our example need not be so complicated; one can
imagine the pointing gesture being misinterpreted. Thus,
avoiding abstractions, as James advises, will not answer the
criticism.
But if, as now seems the case, all attempts at defi­
nition, and especially all attempts at defining abstract 
terms, are foredoomed to failure, what is the use of making 
such an attempt? The Socratic dialogues were just such at­
tempts. Nevertheless, some light can be shed on this ques­
tion by considering them. The whole procedure of definition 
of abstract terms seems to be illegitimate or senseless, but 
then why do the dialogues produce in us the feeling that we 
know more than when we began? The value of the dialogues is 
that they lead us to explore the terrain of language; we 
acquire a better acquaintance with the use of terms by oper­
ating with them. Also, wrestling with terms alters our 
perspective. Not only do we learn the uses of language, but 
we become somewhat aware of its limitations.
Considering the general term "liberally educated 
man," which we have chosen as the focus of this chapter.
&The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll (New York: 
Modern Library), p. 120.
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produces a rather curious effect. Considering it tends to 
make one a suitable candidate for the label he is consider­
ing. And when one has struggled with this term until he sees 
that traditional attempts to justify its employment are non­
sense, he will, of course, no longer need such justifica­
tions. The propositions employing the term "liberally 
educated man" serve as steps to climb beyond them. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein suggests that we must throw away the ladder 
after we have climbed up. I do not see the necessity for 
this; after all, someone else may need it.7
Now I am prepared to offer a definition of the 
liberally educated man I He is. the man who has seen through 
language, and, of course, this definition will be nonsense to 
anyone who has not done just that.
Now let me set forth a model in terms of which we 
may talk about the problems of imparting a liberal educa­
tion, a model that will enable us to talk meaningfully about 
the problem of producing liberally educated men. If I were 
to say at this point, "Let us regard man as a very complex 
servo-mechanism," this could be a mistake. When I am at­
tempting to communicate with another person, I will char­
acterize this situation as the interaction of coupled 
systems with the language serving as the communications 
channel. The parts of the language, however we choose to 
code them, may be characterized as operators. That is, they
7See Wittgenstein, Tractatus. para. 6.5*+*
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function in an elicitative capacity. Therefore, if I use a 
sentence like "man is a servo-mechanism," I would not be 
likely to get a desired response.
Traditionally, communication has been characterized 
far too simply. The usual account is that information is 
passed from one person to another much as one might write 
down a copy of one letter from another; and, of course, 
many people have known that there was something wrong with 
this picture, but what they have said offered no solution to 
the difficulties they envisaged. It is customary to say 
something like "no utterance ever means the same thing to two 
people because of their differences in experience, heredity, 
age, social background, etc." This sort of account will lead 
one to be pessimistic about communication.
Contrast this picture to that of interacting systems. 
Here we are not thinking in terms of duplication from an 
original; rather, our picture is that of one system grad­
ually bringing another into phase with itself. The important 
thing is how the words operate to accomplish this feat, and 
this is why a statement like "man is a servo-mechanism" will 
not do. Such a statement, although approximately right from 
a categorical stand, is self-defeating as a means of estab­
lishing our desired set in someone with a literary back­
ground . It would be like pulling the watch dog's chain 
when we want him to remain sleeping in his dog house.
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The notion of interacting systems can be used to 
make intelligible the features of our culture. I can, for 
instance, characterize the university and the larger com­
munity as interacting systems and discuss the problems of 
education with respect to this coupled system and the infor­
mation channels that accomplish the coupling. When this 
view is taken, it is easy to characterize the university 
community as a system with a measure of control over its 
input to the extent that some degree of stability obtains.
Part of this control over input shows up in the se­
lection of new teachers: those selected to teach have good
academic records, which simply means they have attuned 
themselves to the "system."® They orient themselves towards 
satisfying the criteria of academic success (getting grades), 
and, unfortunately, the permissible internal variety in such 
subsystems (academic people) rapidly, with each new gener­
ation, becomes smaller and smaller. The total picture, 
then, of higher education is nicely described as an oscillat­
ing system with negative feedback tending toward stability 
wherein the permissible internal variety of sub-units is 
practically nil. In others words, the system of higher 
education, once established, tends rapidly toward an ex­
tremely narrow, completely artificial, and absolutely dead
®This attuning of oneself to others and his sur­
roundings is touched on by Hume and is strongly suggested 
in the Romantic poets of England and America. All this was 
discussed in Chapter Five.
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conformity.9 The only thing that saves the situation is the 
input from the larger culture.
But as elementary and secondary education come more 
and more into the hands of people who have graduate degrees, 
the shaping and filtering process is extended more and more 
to lower levels. And as this happens, more and more the 
students will he cast into the mold of their teachers. So 
the input from the larger culture will be in large measure 
stabilized.
And now one may legitimately ask, "What is the point 
of all this?" Well, I have suggested that we think of a man 
as a system, that we think of communication as the inter­
action of coupled systems, and that we may regard the larger 
culture and the institution of higher learning as coupled or 
interacting systems. I have further said that the education 
system can be well characterized as a self-stabilizing ma­
chine with much control over its input and that this control 
is growing. It follows from this, to the extent my descrip­
tion is accurate, that higher education is a danger to the 
wider culture.  ^®
It can be further seen, and not by any means inci­
dentally, that such a system cannot produce the liberally 
educated man. To make this point more explicit, let me now,
9it would take a paper the size of the present 
manuscript to present the evidence for this point alone.
I^This is the point of Harold Benjamin's The Saber- 
Tooth Curriculum.
111
in tèrms of the notions we have just been discussing, offer 
another definition of the liberally educated man. He is. the 
man who thinks in terms of systems— not in terms of parts. 
Furthermore, he is open to information channels of a much 
finer mesh than most men. For purposes of illustration, I 
will confine this to the verbal level. When the umpire in a 
ball game says to a player, "You're out I" it would be 
ludicrous to treat this statement as though it might be a 
proposition— might be true or false. His act of saying 
"You're out 1" is a performative utterance— it is what makes 
the player "out."”*^  The performative and the constantive 
are only two dimensions of an utterance's capacity to serve 
as an operator. There are many levels and shades of meaning 
to our expressions, and these expressions, loaded as they 
are with information, mean much more to the man who can take 
some account of the nuances of meaning contributed to our 
expressions by the surroundings. Such a person is the 
liberally educated man.
The above definition of the liberally educated man-- 
that he thinks in terms of systems— must be amended. The 
liberally educated man also sees just what systems are rele­
vant to a given problem. He has the ability to code
See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. 
ed. J. 0. Urmson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
Lectures I and II. Actually, my example is a little 
simplistic. While the performative element is strong here, 
there are conditions under which one can persuade the umpire 
to change his call.
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properly the elements of a problem Into an adequate system—  
to see the relatedness of things with reference to using 
these relations to alter a preceding state of affairs, with 
suitable input, or to at least predict a subsequent state 
from a given state. In these matters the liberally educated 
man will take account of the monitor and control system's 
limitations— he will appreciate his own limitations.
The important thing is to know what game you are 
playing. If, for instance, a book seller wants to sell books 
to teachers, he can rely upon statistical data for his canned 
sales pitch because the individual teachers as a class do 
not interact to any appreciable extent. If, however, a book 
salesman goes to any particular institution, he had better 
take into account the loose interaction among the teachers 
in that school. And if he really wants to sell books, he 
had best focus down on the much more tightly knit systems—  
the individual teachers. The situation may be schematized 
thus :
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For a given teacher, there will be, of course, inputs and 
outputs to people other than teachers— his immediate family, 
for instance. In practice, these linkages must also be 
taken into consideration. If our salesman approaches each 
teacher as though he or she were just that— his restricted 
stereotype of a teacher— he may succeed in taking some 
orders, but he will not be a salesman. He must, if he is 
to succeed, approach each man as an individual, rapidly ad­
justing his input to a given system (man) in response to 
the output. Of course, the situation is tricky. Systems as 
complex as men have a good deal of control over the input to 
the system— that is, they can rapidly stabilize many forms 
of input so as to preserve a steady state in the system. It 
is not easy to manipulate others. No system can organize 
another unless it (1) "correctly" models the system to be 
controlled and (2) possesses greater variety, is able to map 
the controlled system's linkage to other systems. In plain 
language, if X is to control Y, X must be better informed 
and more intelligent than Y. The extraordinary salesman 
must be an extraordinary mani He must discover ways of 
upsetting, to some extent, the stability of those systems 
he interacts with. Also, he must take account of the 
loosely knit larger systems of which each teacher is a part. 
If he can, for instance, establish contact with teachers 1, 
2, 3, and k then his ability to affect 5 will probably be 
greater. Rarely will the salesman need to consider any 
systems besides the individual teacher and the institution
11^
of which he is a loosely linked member. But, of these two, 
concern with the individual teacher is more important, for 
here, in these direct personal encounters, information chan­
nels almost too numerous to count become available. If the 
salesman is capable, he will instantaneously adjust to the 
feedback from the teacher. This ability to handle social 
situations on what might be called the intuitive or uncon­
scious level is a delicate thing, and it is a sad day in the
life of the salesman when he smiles at the customers and they
1 2do not smile back. Cybernetics can account for this, too.
But now, how does my second definition, framed from 
the standpoint of cybernetics and justified from that stand­
point, agree with my other definition of the liberally 
educated man, given earlier in this chapter? Making these 
definitions fit will bring unity to this enterprise and, I 
hope, provide a basis from which to offer some suggestions 
for creating conditions favorable to the development of 
liberally educated men.
"That he thinks in terms of systems" is what I would 
say of the liberally educated man as an observer— from an 
objective standpoint. This is how he looks from the out­
side, in light of the frame of reference I choose to employ. 
"That he has seen through language" is a definition that, I 
think, can only be properly understood from the perspective 
of one who has done just that— seen through language. Note
I^After Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman.
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that my "objective" definition is just that— "my objective 
definition." It is a definition given from a point of view, 
and it is justified in terms of the language constructed from 
that perspective. My subjective definition has to do with 
one who has freed himself from the categorical perspective, 
together with seeing that this perspective must be abandoned. 
I can say this no better, and perhaps you will say this is 
nonsense, but what I see as important in language from a 
subjective standpoint is not what can be said but what shows 
itself in language as 1 operate with the language.
From my objective view of the liberally educated 
man, I would say that the subjective definition can be ac­
counted for as describing a monitor capable of varying its 
information exchange (both input and output) and taking ac­
count of the fact that it can do just that. From the sub­
jective standpoint, I would describe the objective definition 
as something like a variable lens, or possibly an interpre­
tive schema for bringing about a new way of processing and 
interpreting information. They hang together in this pe­
culiar way— each can explain the other. While of the two 
aspects the subjective is, perhaps, more philosophically 
important, the objective is a necessary complement. It 
allows one to go on and frame a general theory of action.
Other men have, so to speak, seen through language.
I am confident that this was true of St. Paul, Kierkegaard, 
and Wittgenstein, but they had nowhere to go from there.
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The conceptual schema of cybernetics had not been elaborated 
in their time, although Wittgenstein had some insights 
which might have led to a similar position. At any rate, 
most men have only had a categorical framework to fall back 
on; as Wittgenstein said, "A picture held us captive." 
Cybernetics is the necessary complement to the work of 
Wittgenstein.
One might object here, saying, "How is it, then, that 
your 'objective* definition could be applied descriptively 
to people who lived before the concepts of cybernetics were 
worked out?" The answer is, "That is how I interpret these 
men and describe their actions." I, conversant with this 
frame of reference, find there, within the concepts at home 
in that frame of reference, the most adequate way of giving 
an objective definition of the liberally educated man.
Let us retrogress and digress a bit and pick up our 
discussion of ostensive- definitions. The quotation from 
Lewis Carroll shows in a striking way that ostensive def­
initions can always be misunderstood. Well then, why are 
they not always misunderstood, and why does this not make 
us feel that people always slightly misunderstand each 
other? But, first, let me say that in most instances of 
daily intercourse I do not doubt that communication has 
taken place. The fact that I might doubt, and do not, 
seems important. Why is this so? Is it perhaps a sign 
that I am not a philosopher? Can I explain this situation
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from my cybernetic model of man and the world? One possible 
explanation would go like this: When two people converse,
there are, in addition to the extremely crude information 
transfer through what might be called the cognitive meanings 
of words, many other cues and nuances of meaning picked up 
and processed below the conscious level. We might say that 
we only hear the dominant note in the chord with none of the 
other notes and none of the overtones; the conscious mind—  
the monitor— is tone-deaf. And, moreover, it seems to me 
that at those times when we feel most certain that we have 
communicated, we feel in harmony with one another. This can 
be interpreted as information concerning the reciprocal 
feedback adjustments of the two systems to each other. In 
our model, we would have second-order monitors which take 
account of these situations. The foregoing is just a hint 
of how a theory of meaning could be derived from cybernetics.
If one accepts my view of man, what follows for re­
molding education is obvious; so I will be brief. In the 
first place, we examine our educational system in its rela­
tion to our larger culture. Then we study these systems in 
interaction to see just what needs to be done in order that 
the subsystems, men, caught in these larger systems may be 
led to see through their culture— in its most basic form—  
its language. We will try to set up conditions that will 
favor this kind of development.
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One obvious step, in the right direction would be 
gradually (and it can only be done gradually) to break the 
vicious feedback in education whereby the system keeps con­
trol over its input. One of the necessary moves toward ac­
complishing this is by a direct attack on all tests and 
measurements. We must argue that the only instrument pos­
sessing sufficient variety to assess man is man and that 
this cannot be done on the conscious level alone. Strangely 
enough, the concepts of cybernetics could, in this way, be 
used to bring about just those adjustments in society that 
will produce men capable of utilizing these concepts. 3^
I^Evidence for the assertion that bureaucracies, once 
they are well established, need have little contact with the 
larger needs of the supporting culture can be found in 
C. Northcote Parkinson's Parkinson's Law (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1957), PP- 8-11.
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